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ABSTRACT 
This study examines in depth the most common interpretation of the opening of the Third 
Seminole War (1855-1858). The interpretation in question was authored almost thirty years after 
the beginning of the war, and it alleges that the destruction of a Seminole banana plant garden by 
United States soldiers was the direct cause of the conflict. This study analyzes the available 
primary records as well as traces the entire historiography of the Third Seminole War in order to 
ascertain how and why the banana garden account has had such an impactful and long-lasting 
effect. Based on available evidence, it is clear that the lack of fully contextualized primary 
records, combined with the failure of historians to deviate from or challenge previous 
scholarship, has led to a persistent reliance on the banana garden interpretation that continues to 
the present. Despite the highly questionable and problematic nature of this account, it has 
dominated the historiography on the topic and is found is almost every written source that 
addresses the beginning of the Third Seminole War. This thesis refutes the validity of the banana 
garden interpretation, and in addition, provides alternative explanations for the Florida 
Seminoles’ decision to wage war against the United States during the 1850s.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The Third Seminole War began on December 20, 1855 when a United States Army 
surveying unit led by Lieutenant George L. Hartsuff was ambushed and attacked by a war party 
of Seminole Indians while conducting reconnaissance in the Big Cypress Swamp in southern 
Florida. Beginning in the 1880s and continuing to the present day, virtually every written 
account that addresses the opening of the Third Seminole War contains the following 
interpretation, or something strikingly similar: While exploring an abandoned Seminole village, 
several men in Hartsuff’s company maliciously destroyed a banana plant garden belonging to 
Seminole Chief Holata Micco, or Billy Bowlegs, which angered the Chief so much that he led 
the attack on the soldiers two days later. According to many authors, this alleged incident was 
the direct catalyst leading the Seminoles to wage war against U.S. soldiers. The origin of the 
“banana plant story” comes from ex-soldier Andrew Canova, who included it in his book, Life 
and Adventures in South Florida, that was published in 1885, thirty years after the opening 
Seminole attack of the war.    
 This thesis examines the written history of the Third Seminole War in order to determine 
why Canova’s account became the standard interpretation of the conflict’s beginnings, and why 
scholars and the public alike have continued to accept this interpretation despite the multiple 
factors that have persistently undermined its validity. A reassessment of the available evidence 
from the Third Seminole War’s origins as well as an analysis of the social and political context 
in which the U.S. public understood the event help to provide explanations.  Specifically, 
increasing white American sympathy for Indians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, combined with often contradictory but persistent negative images of Native peoples, 
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both influenced and legitimized Canova’s account, while the failure of subsequent historians to 
conduct primary source analysis led to a continued reliance on the banana plant story as 
established fact for more than a century. Only a handful of historians have ever refuted or 
ignored Canova’s interpretation, and the lasting effects on the historiography are significant and 
noteworthy.    
 In order to understand the opening of the Third Seminole War, it is necessary first to 
analyze the written history of the war and come to terms with the larger social trends and 
dominant popular depictions of Native Americans that influenced the first wave of literature on 
the conflict. The early literature on the Third Seminole War cannot be separated from the context 
of the hegemonic white society that produced those writings. White observers of the conflict 
rarely recorded the perspectives of the Florida Seminoles while the Seminoles themselves did not 
keep written records of their history during this era. Historians have interpreted the Seminole 
Wars through the prism of late-nineteenth century white American culture, and almost 
exclusively emphasized the white-authored source material. Consequently, as historian Robert 
Berkhofer explains, “to understand the White image of the Indian is to understand White 
societies and intellectual premises over time more than the diversity of Native Americans. 
Although the social and cultural attributes of Native Americans influenced the conception of 
them by Whites, it is ultimately to the history of White values and ideas that we must turn for the 
basic conceptual categories, classificatory schema, explanatory frameworks, and moral criteria 
by which past and present Whites perceived, observed, evaluated, and interpreted Native 
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Americans.”1 Historian Brian Dippie made a similar argument when he also analyzed the history 
of white perceptions of Native Americans in his book, The Vanishing American (1982). Dippie 
expanded on the concepts put forth by Berkhofer in order to illustrate how these popular attitudes 
both influenced and justified the United States’ Indian policies.2 Therefore, this thesis centers on 
the published work of white authors and the history of ideas regarding American Indians as a 
means of deciphering the endurance of the banana plant incident being considered as the major 
spark that ignited the Third Seminole War.  
 This thesis will also illustrate how the use of Canova’s account by two subsequent 
authors validated its accuracy and usefulness in the eyes of later historians. Minnie Moore-
Willson’s The Seminoles of Florida (1896) and Charles Coe’s Red Patriots (1898) were both 
well-received works by scholars and the public alike, and both were highly influential on the 
historiography thereafter. Both authors relied exclusively on Canova’s account to explain the 
cause of the Third Seminole War, and therefore are vitally important to consider for this study. 
The timing of Canova’s work is crucial to understanding its impact on the literature since it was 
published at a time when little was known about Indians in Florida, and when attitudes were 
beginning to shift towards more positive representations of Native Americans, although the 
undercurrent of traditional belief in the inferiority of the “red race” still persisted.3  
                                                 
1 Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), xvi. 
2 Brian Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1982).  
3 Both Berkhofer and Dippie discuss the continuity and change that has defined white attitudes toward American 
Indians, often alternating between hatred and reverence. Mikaela Adams extends this concept to the Florida 
Seminoles in her article “Savage Foes, Noble Warriors, and Frail Remnants: Florida Seminoles in the White 
Imagination, 1865-1934,” Florida Historical Quarterly 87, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 404-435.   
4 
 
 In addition to evaluating the initial wave of literature on the Third Seminole War, this 
thesis also places special emphasis on two works published later in the twentieth century, both of 
which were written by amateur historians. John O. Parrish’s book Battling the Seminoles (1930) 
and Ray B. Seley, Jr., Jr.’s article “Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants” (1963)4 are two 
of the only accounts that offer alternative explanations to the banana plant incident as the cause 
of the war. Therefore, it is vital to this study to uncover the reasons why almost every historian 
has overlooked or disregarded the research done by Parrish and Seley, Jr.. Most of the available 
works of history that cover the outbreak of the Third Seminole War are examined in this thesis in 
order to determine how dependent they are on the banana plant interpretation, and whether or not 
consideration is given to alternative interpretations or the broader factors that contributed to the 
war’s outbreak.   
Although the focus of this thesis is the secondary literature regarding the outbreak of the 
Third Seminole War, primary source analysis, alternative interpretations, and suggestions for 
further research are provided in Chapter 3 by taking into consideration a wide range of factors 
that contributed to the war. Although Canova claimed to provide an unknown account of Florida 
history, other sources detailed the causes and events of the Third Seminole War as well, 
including newspapers, the writings of settlers and soldiers, both during and after the war, and 
government documents. Also examined are the impact of the many laws and measures enacted 
by Florida’s policy-makers as they pertained to removing the Seminoles by nonviolent means.  
Despite the paucity of source material featuring the voices of the Florida Seminoles, 
Chapter 4 attempts to offer some Seminole perspectives on the opening of the war and their 
                                                 
4 John O. Parrish, Battling the Seminoles: Featuring John Akins, Scout (Lakeland, FL: Southern Printing Company, 
1930). Ray B. Seley, Jr. Jr.,“Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants,” Tequesta 23 (1963): 3-14.  
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possible motivations for fighting in 1855. Some factors have largely been underestimated by 
historians, or are altogether ignored in other interpretations concerning the Third Seminole War. 
Specifically, events and circumstances in Indian Territory (modern day Oklahoma) may have 
had a much larger impact on the Florida Indians’ motivations than most scholars acknowledge. 
The Western Seminoles had been petitioning the U.S. government for a new treaty which would 
provide them with lands separate from their bitter rivals, the Creeks, whom the Seminoles were 
forced to cohabitate with since the removals following the Second Seminole War. After a year 
and a half of bloodshed in the Third Seminole War, the United States signed a new treaty that 
granted to the Western Seminoles lands distinct from the Creeks. In addition, the targets chosen 
by the Seminoles during the war, the importance and symbolism of Seminole agriculture, and the 
role of Chief Billy Bowlegs are addressed in Chapter 4. Despite the lack of primary source 
material related to the outbreak of the Third Seminole War, complex and nuanced explanations 
are still possible and must be examined in order to avoid overly-simplistic and possibly 
patronizing interpretations like the banana plant story that have distorted understandings of the 
Third Seminole War from its beginnings to the present.
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CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATIONS OF THE BANANA PLANT STORY 
 The opening chapter of this thesis closely examines the portion of Andrew Canova’s 
book that introduced his banana plant interpretation of the Third Seminole War to the reading 
public. While discrediting Canova as an historian is not the most useful of exercises, highlighting 
some of the factual errors and inconsistencies in his writing does provide insight into his 
motivations and source base. What follows is an analysis of two books that utilized, and 
therefore largely legitimized, Canova’s banana plant account, Minnie Moore-Willson’s The 
Seminoles of Florida (1896) and Charles Coe’s Red Patriots (1898). The third section of this 
chapter examines how these three books fit into white American society at the turn of the 
twentieth century. The evidence indicates that popular attitudes towards Native Americans 
influenced the acceptance of Canova’s account. The banana plant interpretation included 
elements of both Indian victimization and Indian treachery, and therefore exemplified 
Americans’ emerging sympathy for Indians at the beginning of the twentieth century, while still 
reinforcing traditional depictions of natives’ “savage” behavior.  
 
Summary of the Second and Third Seminole Wars 
 When the U.S. government officially declared the Second Seminole War (1835-1842) to 
be over on August 14, 1842, it had yet to achieve its goal of removing all Native Americans from 
peninsular Florida. The conflict was the longest, bloodiest, and costliest war fought by the 
United States up to that point, and would retain those distinctions in regards to all other 
subsequent so-called Indian Wars. By the end of 1843, 3,824 Seminoles had been sent west to 
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Indian Territory,1 and approximately 360 remained in Florida.2 The commanding officer in 
Florida at the close of the war, General William Worth, concluded a temporary agreement to 
allow those Seminoles still in Florida to remain “for a while,” since hostilities no longer existed, 
at least in his estimation.3 The years of uneasy peace between the second and third wars (1842-
1855) are crucial to understanding the renewal of violence in 1855, and will be carefully 
analyzed in Chapter 3 of this study.  
With the Seminoles’ decision to attack Hartsuff’s company, the Third Seminole War 
began on December 20, 1855. Although the conflict was not an officially declared war by the 
United States, and did not feature any large pitched battles, several violent engagements took 
place throughout 1856 and 1857. The Seminoles employed hit-and-run tactics on isolated 
outposts and settlements, while the U.S. army initiated a search-and-destroy campaign in the 
hopes of locating Seminole villages and strong-holds. The death of important Seminole war 
leader Oscen Tustenuggee, the discovery and destruction of Bowlegs’ primary camp, and the use 
of shallow-draft boats by the Florida militia all contributed to the capitulation of the majority of 
the Seminoles, including Bowlegs and 164 of his followers. Colonel Gustavo Loomis, the 
commanding officer in Florida at the time, proclaimed hostilities at an end on May 8, 1858, 
although seventy-five more Seminoles agreed to emigrate as late as February 15, 1859.4 More 
than one hundred Seminoles remained scattered across South Florida, but the U.S. government 
                                                 
1 John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War: 1835-1842 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1967), 
321.  
2 John T. Sprague, The Origin, Process, and Conclusion of the Florida War (New York: Appleton, 1848), 512.  
3 William Worth, General Order no. 27, August 11, 1842, The Territorial Papers of the United States. The Territory 
of Florida, 1839-1845 Vol. XXV, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 
519. Hereafter cited as Territorial Papers of Florida. 
4 James W. Covington, The Seminoles of Florida. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 134-144. 
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ceased its negotiation attempts and considered the remaining Indians too small in number to 
warrant any further removal efforts.  
 
Andrew Canova’s Life and Adventures in South Florida  
In 1885, almost thirty years after the outbreak of the Third Seminole War in Florida, 
former soldier Andrew P. Canova published a small book entitled Life and Adventures in South 
Florida. In the introduction, former Florida judge and congressman Robert W. Davis informs the 
reader that Canova’s sketches were originally contributed to the Southern Sun newspaper of 
Palatka, Florida, as weekly articles, but, “the suggestion of their permanent preservation in some 
collected form was so often made him that he finally consented to give them to the public” in 
book form. Davis goes on to suggest that Life and Adventures “graphically deals with a phase of 
life in Florida which will nowhere else be found.”5 This claim is not as much of an exaggeration 
as it may first appear. Besides government records and newspaper articles, no substantial 
writings were readily available to the general public concerning the Third Seminole War until 
Canova’s book was published. This is one of the primary reasons why his work was so 
influential, and since no alternative interpretations existed, Canova’s accounts were well-trusted 
by virtually every author who wrote after him. Life and Adventures was updated and re-
published in 1906, which provides further evidence of the book’s popularity. Despite its initial 
success, and its usefulness as a unique source on a little-known subject, Canova’s book, and the 
highly questionable interpretations contained therein, has had a surprisingly long-lasting effect 
upon the historiography of the Third Seminole War.    
                                                 
5 Andrew P. Canova, Life and Adventures in South Florida (Tampa, FL: Tribune Printing Co., 1885), introduction, 
np. 
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In the opening paragraph of Life and Adventures, Canova contends that he provides his 
accounts “with all possible accuracy,” but he also warns the reader that his book “shall be a 
description of personal experiences and observations, rather than a history of the war itself.”6 He 
goes on to state that “In placing this series of sketches before the public, of course I must say 
something about the way the war started.” (My emphasis). It seems that Canova’s opening few 
pages, which contain the banana plant incident, were not originally a part of his newspaper 
articles, but rather were added later when he decided to publish his tales as a book. Canova’s 
interpretation of the opening of the Third Seminole War is included in his work because it 
provides a neat beginning to his narrative, not because he was actually involved in any way with 
the initial Seminole assault. Canova joined the war effort in January of 1856 as a member of the 
State militia volunteers, and was not a federal soldier. That fact does not necessarily preclude 
him from obtaining accurate second-hand information from the regular troops. But a careful 
reading of Canova’s work, as well as the available primary records, suggest that he was unlikely 
to have been fully knowledgeable regarding the specifics of the attack on Hartsuff’s company, or 
the full context of the situation in general.  
Canova begins his account by describing the garden of Billy Bowlegs which contained 
“some magnificent banana plants, which were the delight and solace of the chief’s heart. He had 
reared them with parental care, until they were fifteen feet high, and he was jealous of his 
darlings.”7 That a Seminole chief maintained an impressive garden is not surprising, but the 
official military reports of reconnaissance state that this particular village had been abandoned 
before the previous wet season, and that all signs indicated that no Indians had been present there 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 5.  
7 Ibid., 6. 
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for some time. Canova goes on to explain that “some of Hartsoff’s (sic) men (like a good many 
of us) couldn’t keep their hands off the beauties.” The following morning, “Bowlegs came 
through the early mist, bathing his stalwart ankles in the dew…coming to his beloved garden, he 
was surprised and shocked to find the banana plants, once so tall and graceful, with leaves torn to 
shreds, and some of the stalks broken short off at the ground by some ruthless hand.” To modern 
readers, it may seem obvious that Canova’s writing has more in common with dramatic literature 
than with objective works of history. Even still, the notion that soldiers may have helped 
themselves to some fruit is not an inherently problematic claim. But, the following segment of 
Canova’s work should have raised red flags amongst scholars as an obvious attempt to embellish 
the events surrounding the opening of the war, and to reduce the interpretation to a matter of 
personal confrontation.    
Canova claims that Bowlegs visited the soldier’s camp and “accused the men of the 
outrage. They admitted it with the utmost coolness, but signified no intention of making good the 
loss, nor of giving any cause for their actions, other than they wanted to see how ‘Old Billy 
would cut up.’ When Billy saw that remonstrance and complaint were useless, he went back and 
summoned his braves together. ‘Hyeefus! Eestahotka holiwagus! Was the war cry.” So, for 
Canova, the onset of the war was a simple case of cause and effect: a personal insult was 
inflicted on Chief Bowlegs, causing him to seek retribution through violence. While this 
interpretation provides a clear narrative that is easy for most people to understand, the full range 
of factors and circumstances surrounding the Third Seminole War were so complex that a 
simplified explanation is not adequate. And, if the garden destruction story has some truth to it, it 
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is reasonable to assume that some U.S. soldiers may have actually believed that the incident was 
the primary cause of the Seminoles’ decision to wage war.  
Although Canova claims to utilize the “most authentic accounts” for his information 
regarding the Seminole attack, he makes several errors in detail which indicates that his sources 
were not written accounts, but rather oral. For one, Canova had the date wrong. The Seminole 
attack occurred on the morning of December 20, 1855, not December 24, as he states. And two, 
he spells Hartsuff’s name wrong, as Hartsoff. These two minor errors suggest that Canova’s 
knowledge of the events almost certainly came to him through word-of-mouth from other troops, 
and he was unlikely to have been aware of the full context of the situation. Supporting this notion 
is the fact that when his book was re-published in 1906, Canova included mention of “several 
instances” that occurred before and during the war which he was not even aware of when the 
“first edition was published.”8 The instances he refers to are fairly well-known events that were 
commonly found in print in the state’s newspapers as well as in the books by Minnie Moore-
Willson and Charles Coe, both of which were published several years prior to Canova’s re-
publication. It is interesting to note that someone who both fought in the war and wrote an 
“authentic” account of the conflict’s opening attack was not even aware of some of the war’s 
most significant battles and events.   
      Another passage of Canova’s introduction deserves analysis. While describing the 
Seminole attack on the U.S. troops, Canova states that Hartsuff “ran into the water and began 
emptying his Colt’s revolver at the Indians, who were soon dismayed by the strange weapon...It 
was the first revolver they had seen, and Bowlegs promised to cease firing if Hartsoff (sic) would 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 53. 
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come out and show his pistol.” While there is certainly an historical link between Samuel Colt’s 
firearms and the Seminole Wars in Florida, there are still several problems with Canova’s 
sequence of the events. For one, Colt’s revolving rifles and pistols were actually first introduced 
in Florida during the Second Seminole War, when General Thomas Jesup authorized the 
purchase of fifty of Colt’s rifles, and twenty-five pistols, in early 1838.9 The success of Colt’s 
repeating firearms was widely known to both soldiers and civilians throughout the United States, 
and Colt was producing between 1,500 and 2,000 pistols per week by the early 1850s.10 
Furthermore, several of Colt’s rifles fell into the hands of Seminole warriors during the Second 
Seminole War, and since Bowlegs and others fought in both the Second and the Third Wars, it 
seems unlikely that the Indians would have been wholly ignorant of the newer technology.  
 There are a few elements of accuracy in Canova’s passage. Hartsuff did hide in a lily 
pond for cover, and the Indians did call for him to “come out, come out.” But, he did not run into 
the pond while continuing to fire upon the Indians. He actually fell into the water while trying to 
escape, having been wounded badly, and could barely keep his head above the water line. When 
the attack initially began, Hartsuff was in his tent and did return fire with his revolver, but after 
being wounded twice, he was unable to load his own gun, and had to rely on a private to load the 
musket of a fallen soldier for him, which he was only able to fire with one functional arm. After 
receiving a third wound, a bullet to the chest, Hartsuff decided to abandon the fight and made his 
escape. The lieutenant eventually found his way to a camp of soldiers three days later. After 
recovering from his wounds, on February 27 Hartsuff was ordered to command a select unit of 
                                                 
9 Wayne R. Austerman, “Privately Purchased During the Seminole War, Sam Colt's Revolver Carbine Did Not 
Remain a Secret Weapon For Long,” Military History 14, no. 2 (June 1997): 1-2.  
10 R. L. Wilson, Colt: An American Legend (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985), 66.  
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mounted men, who were given special equipment, including Colt’s revolvers and lariats.11 So, 
Canova was partially correct about Hartsuff utilizing a Colt’s revolver, but his timing was off by 
a few months.     
It is somewhat unfair to criticize Canova so harshly since he was not a professional 
historian, and was clearly writing with an intention to captivate readers with extraordinary tales 
of Indian fighting and wilderness adventures. He even includes a story about a fight supposedly 
witnessed by a fellow soldier between a bear and a panther, and another in which a soldier 
allegedly mounted an alligator, “which he rode to the shore, like a horse.”12 Anecdotes such as 
these should have been a warning to all of his readers as to the seriousness and accuracy of his 
book, but for whatever reason, subsequent authors have continued to rely on his interpretation of 
the opening Seminole assault of the Third Seminole War. The Seminoles of Florida (1896), by 
Minnie Moore-Wilson, and Red Patriots (1898), by Charles Coe, were two of the first books to 
include Canova’s banana plant account, and helped to lay the foundation that would influence 
the first wave of the historiography in the early twentieth century. While there is no way of 
knowing how popular or well-read Canova’s Life and Adventures in South Florida was in the 
late nineteenth century, it may be speculated that the book received a second publication run in 
1906 due in part to the success of the works by Moore-Willson and Coe.    
 
Minnie Moore-Willson and Charles Coe 
   In 1896, Minnie Moore-Willson published The Seminoles of Florida, and although the 
tone is often sentimental and subjective, it stands as one of the first efforts to provide a complete 
                                                 
11 Seley, Jr. Jr.,“Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants,” 12-13. 
12 Canova, Life and Adventures, 99, 120.  
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history of the Florida Seminoles. Moore-Willson, along with her husband James Willson, were 
key members of the “Friends of the Florida Seminoles,” and their efforts proved instrumental in 
the passage of an act by the Florida Legislature which provided the Seminoles with a permanent 
reservation covering 100,000 acres in South Florida.13  
Interestingly, Moore-Willson’s first edition did not include any mention of the Third 
Seminole War, but rather, only in a revised edition published in 1910 does Moore-Willson 
discuss Bowlegs and the opening of that conflict. “According to most authentic reports,” begins 
Moore-Willson, before going on to copy Canova’s account practically verbatim. Bowlegs’ “fine 
garden,” contained “some magnificent banana plants which were the delight of the old Indian’s 
heart.”14 She then describes the exact same scene of vandalism, confrontation, rebuttal, and the 
subsequent Seminole attack, changing few words from Canova’s writing. Where Canova writes, 
“Like a flash of electricity the news encircled and permeated the South, and Billy Bowlegs 
became the target of every pioneer’s rifle,” Moore-Willson echoes, “Like a flash of electricity 
the news encircled Florida, and Billy Bowlegs became the target of many old muskets.”  
Although Canova is not cited or mentioned directly anywhere in The Seminoles of Florida, it is 
clear from Moore-Willson’s almost complete reliance on Life and Adventures in South Florida 
that Canova’s work was her sole source for her segment on the Third Seminole War. The fact 
that Moore-Willson did not make an attempt to corroborate Canova’s work with available 
                                                 
13 Esperanza B. Varona, Biographical Note, Minnie Moore-Willson Papers, 1888-1949: University of Miami Special 
Collections, 
http://proust.library.miami.edu/findingaids/?p=collections/findingaid&id=675&q=&rootcontentid=29824 (accessed 
January 17, 2015).   
14 Minnie Moore-Willson, The Seminoles of Florida (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1910), 39. 1896 
edition: https://archive.org/details/seminolesofflori00moor,1910 edition: 
https://archive.org/details/seminolesflorid00willgoog (both accessed November 22, 2014).   
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newspapers, government documents, or from her contacts among the Seminole people, is telling, 
and foreshadows a tendency amongst scholars to deem first-hand accounts written by ex-soldiers 
in this conflict to be mostly trustworthy.     
Considering Moore-Willson’s activism and work with the Seminole tribe, it is apparent 
that her book bears many similarities to, and was heavily influenced by, the work of Helen Hunt 
Jackson, and her groundbreaking book on the mistreatment of all American Indians, A Century of 
Dishonor (1881). Just as Jackson intended her work to influence changes in governmental 
policies towards Native tribes, Moore-Willson’s book had a similar objective of shedding light 
on the Seminole cause and their need for improvement in living standards. Moore-Willson 
sometimes went to extremes to justify the past actions of the Florida Seminoles, such as her 
claim that, “Without doubt the Indian has always been the victim…and while the Indians 
themselves, in many cases practiced cruelty, it was always in retaliation for some grievous wrong 
of anterior date.”15 While her assertion regarding Seminole retaliation for previous wrongs could 
be applied directly to the banana plant incident, it is more likely that, even if the garden 
vandalism story is true, it was part of a larger pattern of mistreatment and harassment of the 
Seminoles, and that grievous wrongs had been multiplying for years leading up to the outbreak 
of violence in December 1855.  
Charles Coe was a newspaper editor born in Connecticut, who moved to Florida later in 
life and became interested in the Florida Seminoles and their struggle to obtain legally-titled land 
in the late nineteenth century. Coe’s Red Patriots: The Story of the Seminoles (1898) was the 
only full-length book that he ever wrote, and the explicit purpose of the work was to paint the 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 1910 edition, 57-58. 
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Florida Seminoles in a positive light in order to bring attention to their attempt to acquire land. In 
the introduction to the reprinted edition of Red Patriots (1974), historian Charlton Tebeau 
suggests that because of Coe’s “singleness of purpose” he “sometimes overstates the case for the 
Indians.” Tebeau also notes however, that Coe “makes a considerable contribution to Florida 
history” thanks to his analysis of the Florida Seminoles in the years following the end of the 
Second Seminole War after the vast majority of the tribe was removed west to Indian Territory.16 
Despite Coe’s biases and intentions, Red Patriots is a very well-researched effort, due in large 
part to his ability to live in Washington D.C. during his investigation into the history of the 
Florida Seminoles. He was able to utilize government records and examine evidence in a manner 
that no author before him had attempted.  
While Moore-Willson relied primarily on personal affiliations and locally-published 
works for her source material, Coe provided analysis of the documentary records. Coe included 
extensive broader context in his attempt to provide a full history, including consideration of 
events both in Florida and in Indian Territory, and the years of removal negotiations leading up 
to the war. Despite his attempt at a more complete approach, Coe still pointed to the alleged 
garden incident as the spark that led directly to hostilities, calling it, “the immediate cause of this 
last warfare with the Seminoles.” Coe “submits the valued testimony of Andrew P. Canova, a 
native Floridian, who served in the campaign,” and goes on to reprint most of Canova’s 
introduction in its entirety. Coe then offers some insight of his own in support of Canova’s work, 
stating that the Seminole attack on Hartsuff’s team “had been clearly provoked by his men,” and 
that even though “the Indians had retired to their homes immediately after taking revenge, war 
                                                 
16 Charles H. Coe, Red Patriots: The Story of the Seminoles (1898; repr., Gainesville, FL: University Presses of 
Florida, 1974), xxi-xxxiii.  
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was at once proclaimed.” So, Coe took for granted that Hartsuff’s men maliciously destroyed 
Bowlegs’ garden and were well aware of likely retaliation, but he also implies that the 
Seminoles’ revenge was justified, that they sought no further war targets, and that the decision to 
wage war was determined solely by the United States following the initial Seminole attack.     
Regarding the subsequent bloodshed following the initial Seminole assault, Coe stated that, “In 
January and March, 1856, two encounters took place between the soldiers and Indians,” and that, 
“The last battle of the year occurred on April 7.”17 In reality, between January and July of 1856, 
the Seminoles committed at least ten different hit-and-run style assaults, mostly directed at 
isolated settlements and small detachments of troops, killing twenty-eight soldiers and 
civilians.18 Although the Seminoles held the offensive in the early stages of the war, Coe claims 
that they were “hunted like wild beasts.”19 There were a few more traditional style battles during 
this time as well, but instead of considering the affair mutual combat between bitter foes, Coe 
implies that the Indians were correct to exact revenge, and that the United States was wrong to 
pursue a war against them for that reason.   
By stating that the U.S. government made the decision to proclaim war against the 
Florida Indians after Hartsuff’s company was ambushed, Coe implies that the Seminoles did not, 
and could not have, made that decision autonomously. This perspective fails to acknowledge that 
the Seminoles could have possessed the agency and competency required to undertake military 
operations against American forces. With several of the Florida Indians’ leaders having gained 
combat experience in the previous wars with the United States, including Bowlegs and Sam 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 211-213. 
18 James W. Covington, The Billy Bowlegs War: 1855-1858 The Final Stand of The Seminoles Against The Whites 
(Chuluota, FL: The Mickler House Publishers, 1982), 41-53. 
19 Coe, Red Patriots, 215. 
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Jones, and given the tense situation in South Florida as the pressure to emigrate West mounted, it 
is evident that the war party of Seminoles who initiated the conflict was fully aware that their 
actions would lead to explicit open warfare. Regardless of the banana plant theory, the attacking 
Seminoles made a deliberate decision to begin a war with the U.S. army, knowing full well that 
most white Floridians had been waiting for such an excuse to forcibly expel the remnant of the 
tribe from the peninsula.  
 
Social Context 
The Third Seminole War ended when the western branch of the tribe was finally granted 
a new treaty separating them from the Creeks in Indian Territory, and Chief Bowlegs and his 
followers agreed to leave Florida in 1858. There still remained more than one hundred Seminoles 
living in Florida, but they kept their contact with whites to a bare minimum over the following 
two decades. By the 1880s, the Florida Seminoles reemerged in the public’s consciousness and 
white Americans began to seek answers regarding their status and the events of the little-known 
third war. So in this sense, Canova helped fill a gap in the literature by providing a simple 
explanation for the war’s outbreak. Canova’s source material for his work came directly from his 
own memory of events, but historian David Thelen reminds us that memories are always 
constructed, never merely reproduced, and that people often construct memories in response to 
changing circumstances, usually to satisfy a present need or concern.20 Considering the limited 
number of writings at that time that addressed the Third Seminole War, Canova was fulfilling a 
need since many white Americans had a newfound fascination with the Florida Seminoles and 
                                                 
20 David Thelen, “Memory and American History,” Journal of American History 75, no. 4 (March 1989): 1118-
1121.  
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wanted to know more about their wars with the United States. Thelen also insists that, for 
modern historians, “the important question is not how accurately a recollection fitted some piece 
of a past reality, but why historical actors constructed their memories in a particular way at a 
particular time.”21 In order to answer this question, it is useful to consider the broader societal 
and cultural trends that influenced popular opinions of Native Americans in the late nineteenth 
century.  
In the early and mid-nineteenth century, white attitudes towards American Indians were 
dominated by suspicion, distrust, and hatred, especially in the southeastern states and those 
frontier areas where interaction with Indians was a daily reality. But, by the end of the century, 
and particularly in those areas vacated by Indian populations, attitudes toward them began to 
shift to curiosity, sympathy, and of course, paternalism. Some Americans insisted that the Indian 
races were doomed to extinction, and the efforts of painters like George Catlin and Charles Bird 
King, along with former Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas McKenney to at least preserve 
images of important Native American leaders, attests to the once sincere belief that all North 
American Indians would one day vanish altogether. The concept of the “Vanishing American” 
both influenced and justified governmental policies, first with Removal and the Reservation 
system, and then with the Dawes Act of 1887 and individual land allotment.  Policy makers 
hoped these efforts would assimilate natives into mainstream culture, and if not, perhaps 
extinction of Indians would actually become a reality.22  
Reformers and others sympathetic to the cause began to realize that the Indian problem 
was not simply going to disappear, either through assimilation or extinction, and many 
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Americans demanded more practical solutions, as well as admissions of past failures. The United 
States’ former dealings with the Indian tribes, including forced removal and innumerable broken 
treaties, came under more and more scrutiny and criticism. The American public also took notice 
when atrocities and outrages continued to be committed towards Native Americans throughout 
the late 1800s. Numerous outright massacres, including at Sand Creek, Fort Robinson, and 
Wounded Knee, the virtual genocide taking place in California, the murders of Crazy Horse and 
Sitting Bull, and the Ponca tribe’s controversial legal battles, just to name a few, contributed to 
the new viewpoint that American Indians were largely helpless, and sometimes blameless, 
victims. Several national Indian organizations, including the Women’s National Indian 
Association (WNIA), were formed for the purpose of aiding their cause, and of course, 
civilizing, Christianizing, and educating the Indians.23 
Works of non-fiction began to appear that condemned the government’s past actions, 
such as Helen Hunt Jackson’s A Century of Dishonor (1881), and former Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs George Manypenny’s, Our Indian Wards (1880). Jackson, partly influenced by 
witnessing Ponca Chief Standing Bear’s plea for assistance on an eastern U.S. speaking tour in 
1879, hoped to expose the hypocrisy of the treaty system. To her, treaties were “convenient and 
obvious fictions,” and could so easily be “abrogated since one of the parties had no legal status 
and thus no business entering into treaties in the first place.” Jackson’s book was highly critical 
of United States’ Indian policies and had a massive impact on popular opinion, with some 
comparing it to what Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin did for the antislavery 
                                                 
23 For analysis of Indian atrocities see William M. Osborn, The Wild Frontier: Atrocities During the American-
Indian War From Jamestown to Wounded Knee (New York: Random House, 2000).  
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movement.24 Likewise, Manypenny’s Our Indian Wards condemned the atrocities committed 
against Native populations and insisted that the desire for Indian lands would only continue until 
significant reforms were enacted.  
These reform movements and newer attitudes spread to the Florida Seminoles in the form 
of a friends’ society (“Friends of the Florida Seminoles”) dedicated to obtaining land for them, 
and two books that initiated the first wave of literature on the Florida Seminoles and greatly 
influenced the historiography thereafter. Both Moore-Willson’s The Seminoles of Florida (1896) 
and Coe’s Red Patriots (1898) were biased works of advocacy, but were highly regarded by the 
community of white Americans interested in Indian reform, and both had a positive impact on 
the Florida Seminoles’ quest to obtain legally titled lands in the state. Historian Harry Kersey, Jr. 
notes that Moore-Willson’s work in particular “was a poorly written, undocumented, maudlin 
creampuff, and almost totally unreliable for its ethno-historic content – yet perfectly attuned to 
the national sentiment for reform of federal Indian policies at the end of the nineteenth 
century.”25 So, despite the history of bitter warfare with the Seminoles, by the end of the century, 
a portion of Florida’s white population was dedicated to assisting them and preventing further 
animosity. 
Despite these developments that painted Native Americans in a more positive light than 
any time previous in the history of the United States, most representations of Indians persisted in 
portraying them as “savage,” uncivilized, and still of an inferior social status. Even the most 
renowned historians of the nineteenth century, George Bancroft and Francis Parkman, 
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considered American history itself as “the epic struggle between civilization and savagery,” and 
were firm believers in the divine providence of “Manifest Destiny” and the intrinsic inferiority of 
certain races.26 Theodore Roosevelt, a prolific writer of history himself, even dedicated his four-
volume series The Winning of the West to Parkman, with the inscription, “To Francis Parkman, 
To Whom Americans Who Feel a Pride in the Pioneer History of Their Country Are So 
Indebted.”27 The concept of an ever-advancing Westward frontier as being the quintessential way 
to define the American experience, crystallized of course by Frederick Jackson Turner in his 
famous address in 1893, incorporates the basic premise that Native peoples stood in the way of 
the coming progress and therefore would inevitably either have to assimilate or perish. Whether 
American Indians were viewed as “noble” or “ignoble,” the underlying assumption is that they 
all still shared the same “savage” traits, and were not fit to participate in civilized society.28 In A 
Final Promise, Frederick Hoxie contends that the intensifying racial tensions of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contributed to the U.S. abandoning its goal of extending 
full citizenship to American Indians, noting the failure of the government’s “final promise” of 
complete assimilation.29 The inherent contradiction was that while many white Americans had a 
                                                 
26 Michael McConnell, Introduction to the Bison Book Edition of The Conspiracy of Pontiac: And the Indian War 
After the Conquest of Canada to the Massacre at Michillimackinac, by Francis Parkman, (Lincoln, NE: University 
of Nebraska Press), viii. See also Peter Charles Hoffer, Past Imperfect: Facts, Fictions, and Fraud--American 
History from Bancroft and Parkman to Ambrose, Bellesiles, Ellis, and Goodwin (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
21-28.   
27 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), np. 
28 See Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian. Also, Brian Dippie, “American Indians: The Image of the Indian.” Nature 
Transformed, TeacherServe. National Humanities Center 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nattrans/ntecoindian/essats/indimage.htm (accessed April 23, 2014). 
29 Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 239-244.  
23 
 
desire to atone for past Indian abuses, Native peoples were still largely viewed as inferior due to 
the dominant racial ideology of the period.     
Regarding the Florida Seminoles, while some white Floridians hoped to shed a positive 
light on the plight of their state’s Indian population, many others persisted in considering them 
barbarous bloodthirsty murderers. Mikaela Adams, in her essay “Savage Foes, Noble Warriors, 
and Frail Remnants: Florida Seminoles in the White Imagination, 1865-1934,” highlights that 
while public perception was slowly being altered, “writers of dime novels and Indian-fighter 
memoirs continued to draw upon ideas of Seminole savagery well into the 1930s to capture the 
attention of their audiences and to create a foil for imagined white bravery and racial 
‘superiority.’”30 Since the three bloody Seminole Wars had captured the American public’s 
imagination, the Seminoles were considered the true-to-life embodiment of the “Indian menace.” 
As South Florida remained an unconquered frontier in the eyes of many whites, comparisons to 
the “Wild West” were easy to draw, and even the popular weekly publication Buffalo Bill Stories 
featured an issue that detailed the fictional exploits of savage Seminoles who commonly fed 
prisoners to alligators.31 The work of Andrew Canova fit seamlessly into this trend of writing. 
While his banana plant account may inspire some sympathy for the supposedly disrespected 
Seminole Chief, the many typical descriptions of savage Indian characteristics found throughout 
the book belie the ideology behind the writing. Canova attempted to show compassion for the 
Seminoles in his work, but his use of terms like “half-made,” “dusky,” and “rascals” illustrate his 
resentment and condescension.32  
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Coe and Moore-Willson are also good examples of the contradictory attitudes towards 
American Indians around the turn of the twentieth century. While they lauded the integrity and 
honesty of the Florida Seminoles, both authors considered them somehow an exception to the 
rule of Indian savagery. Coe noted that the Seminoles displayed none of the “inhuman cruelty” 
that “characterized most of our Western tribes,”33 while Moore-Willson maintained that “the 
caustic remark that the only good Indian is a dead Indian might apply to the savage Apache,” but 
not to the Seminoles.34 Despite her high regard for the Seminoles, in typical contradictory 
fashion, Moore-Willson still considered them a “helpless” and “frightened people,” highlighting 
both the sympathy and condescension expressed by even those who considered themselves 
champions of Indian rights.35   
Moore-Willson and Coe both relied exclusively on the banana plant account to explain 
the cause of the Third Seminole War, with Coe praising the “valued testimony of Andrew P. 
Canova…who served in the campaign.”36 Both of their books had a clear agenda of casting the 
Seminoles in a favorable light in order to bring attention to their situation and obtain legally-
titled lands in the state for them. Providing a complete history of the Seminole people, including 
their wars with the U.S., was not the primary goal of either author, although both attempted to do 
so. Historian Peter Hoffer reminds us that writers during this era were fundamentally amateur 
historians, “not because they were inept or inattentive to their research or writing but because 
they did not earn a living teaching or writing history.37 This observation is certainly true of 
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Moore-Willson and Coe, as their books on the Seminoles were the only full-length published 
works of history either ever completed. But, considering the dearth of reliable literature 
regarding the Third Seminole War during the following decades, both books were accepted as 
accurate and reasonably objective historical scholarship by subsequent authors.    
 
Conclusion 
It was in this context that Canova’s interpretation was so willingly accepted. His “valued 
testimony” was praised by two respected authors, and his account simultaneously fit into the 
newer perception of Indian victimization, while it also reinforced the traditional belief that 
Indians were sensitive to personal insult and prone to react with “savage” violence. The banana 
plant interpretation satisfied the two requirements to be considered accurate by late-nineteenth 
century white American standards regarding Indians. For one, the Seminoles were depicted as 
blameless victims who had war forced upon them by the actions of a few ruthless individual 
whites. And on the flipside, the Seminoles could still be viewed as savages due to both the trivial 
nature of the event that allegedly caused them to attack, and because their subsequent attacks 
were portrayed as barbarous frontier depredations, rather than as strategic military objectives.  
Canova absolved the Seminoles from any wrongdoing though by explaining the attack as 
a matter of justified retaliation, placing blame on the actions of a few cruel soldiers who acted on 
their accord and essentially forced a war upon the Indians. The Seminole assault was presented 
as an instance of immediate revenge for a personal affront, a concept certainly familiar to white 
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American southerners, with their traditions of masculine honor and acceptable violence.38 But, 
this interpretation denies that the Seminoles could have planned their campaign of warfare in 
advance for a much larger purpose. Rather than viewing the Seminole decision to attack as 
tactical and strategic, it is depicted as reactionary and short-sighted. By placing the entire blame 
for the war on the alleged actions of Hartsuff’s men, Canova’s account also conveniently 
removed any responsibility from the national government, Florida’s settlers and politicians, 
including the state militia volunteers, and white society in general. It was an easily-digestible and 
guilt-free interpretation that was unconditionally accepted as fact by the first wave of authors to 
write on the Third Seminole War, since Canova was considered an eye-witness to the events. 
The timing of the publications by Canova, Moore-Willson, and Coe is an important factor 
to consider when trying to determine the reasons for their lasting influence on the historiography. 
The shifting attitudes of white Americans and the new-found fascination with Indians, the 
reemergence of the Florida Seminoles into public view, and the lack of full-length literature on 
their more recent history, all played a part. And while none of the three authors provided what 
would be considered professional works of history by modern standards, with Coe’s being the 
closest, they did offer a wealth of information that was new to most readers. The reasons why the 
subsequent generations of authors continued to rely so heavily on the banana plant account found 
in these three early books is the next subject under consideration for this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: MODERN HISTORIANS AND THE BANANA PLANT 
STORY 
 This chapter traces the entire known historiography of the Third Seminole War in a 
mostly chronological fashion, and includes every written piece that discusses the Seminole 
assault on Hartsuff’s unit. A common theme among many of the works is that they are not 
primarily focused on that opening attack of the conflict, but rather on peripheral or narrower 
topics. Another common occurrence is that many of the authors were not professionally trained 
historians. Virtually every source, especially early on, repeats Canova’s account with little 
variation, but two pieces deserve special attention for their challenge to the standard 
interpretation: John Parrish’s Battling the Seminoles (1930), and Ray B. Seley, Jr., Jr.’s 
“Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants” (1963). Parrish’s book alleges that the Seminoles 
made a decision to attack federal troops at a tribal council meeting well prior to Hartsuff’s foray, 
and Seley, Jr.’s study flatly refutes the validity of the banana plant tale, yet most subsequent 
authors ignored the work by these two amateur historians. Only in recent years have a handful of 
authors chosen to cast doubt on, or altogether ignore Canova’s account, and their contributions 
are discussed together towards the end of this chapter.    
After Moore-Willson and Coe endorsed and brought attention to Canova’s account, the 
banana plant story became the standard accepted interpretation in written works that addressed 
the Third Seminole War. Since so little was known and so few sources existed that detailed the 
Third War and the lives of the Florida Seminoles thereafter, Coe and Moore-Willson’s 
contributions were significant, and trusted by subsequent authors. The Second Seminole War 
was a much more common and popular literary topic, as evidenced by the proliferation of 
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sensational accounts found in periodicals.1 In addition, the historiography of the war had begun 
much earlier with the publication of John T. Sprague’s The Origin, Progress, and Conclusions of 
the Florida war, and Joshua R. Giddings’ The Exiles of Florida, both in 1848. But, whenever the 
Third War was discussed in these works, it was invariably Canova’s account that was used to 
explain the outbreak of hostilities in 1855.   
 
The First Wave of Literature: 1925-1959 
 In 1858, Harper’s Weekly published a story that detailed a trip to New Orleans taken by 
Seminole Chief Billy Bowlegs and other Florida Seminoles during one of the government’s 
removal negotiation attempts. In 1925, forestry and agricultural specialist John Gifford reprinted 
and published the Harper’s piece into book form, with comments “freely added” by the author. 
Billy Bowlegs and the Seminole War (1925) includes the original Harper’s story in its entirety, as 
well as explanatory interjections by Gifford, such as the inclusion of Canova’s banana plant 
interpretation of the opening of the conflict. In Gifford’s version, the Seminole War of 1855 
“was really due to a surveyor in the Big Cypress who stole Billy Bowlegs’ bananas and 
ruthlessly trampled on the plants out of sheer bravado and meanness. They refused to make good 
the loss and shots followed.”2  
By initiating the Third Seminole War, Gifford contends that the Seminoles were “more or 
less in the right,”3 but he nevertheless concludes that the inherent racial qualities of Indians were 
to blame for the Seminoles’ history of conflict. Confirming the conclusion reached by Hoxie that 
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2 John C. Gifford, Billy Bowlegs and the Seminole War (Coconut Grove, FL: Triangle Co., 1925), 50. 
3 Ibid., 9-10. 
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racial attributes contributed heavily to the perceptions of Native Americans in the early twentieth 
century, Gifford regularly used racial criteria to classify and explain different groups of people. 
Gifford noted that “The Indian mind, like the mind of the Oriental, is hard to fathom,” and 
suggested that the settlement and development of South Florida was ultimately beyond the 
understanding of the Seminole people, that the coming of industry was something “which the 
Indian fails to comprehend.”4 Although he called the Seminoles “lowly” and “considered dirty 
by some,” they were “never-the-less far superior to the cunning thieving gypsy.” Reiterating a 
claim made by the Harper’s author, Gifford asserts that the Black allies of the Seminoles exerted 
considerable influence over their Indian masters, since “The negro is more aggressive and 
adaptable. He is happier even in bondage.”5 Hoxie contends that “In the early twentieth century 
American leaders argued that each group should play its proper role and work with others to 
preserve the social order. Blacks should take on manual tasks and keep to themselves in the rural 
South. Eastern Europeans should be small merchants and tradesmen. Native-born whites should 
be professionals and political leaders.”6 Gifford extended this concept even within the realm of 
manual labor, himself witnessing that “The Hindoos excelled at hoeing, the Indians at picking 
berries and the negroes at cutting the bush.” According to Gifford, to escape the practice of racial 
categorization, all that Native peoples had to do was embrace capitalism, since “Color prejudice 
fades away in the presence of ability and especially wealth,” noting that “The Navajo is about the 
only tribe that is self-supportive and increasing in population, mainly due to the blanket 
business.”7 So, Gifford continued the trend of examining the Seminole people in terms of their 
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racial traits and perceived deficiencies in comparison to white society and white values. And 
while his writing is certainly more racially charged than most other authors, his work still 
highlights the immense influence that the dominant ideology of the era had on written histories 
of Native Americans.   
 Gifford’s book contains other examples which make it consistent with the dominant view 
points towards Native Americans in the early twentieth century. The triumph of civilization over 
savagery and the fatalism embodied in the concept of the “Vanishing Indian” are both evident in 
his writing. He also attempted to rationalize the history and fate of Native Americans while 
absolving white society of any wrongdoing. Gifford noted the high death rate and virtual 
extinction of certain tribes, but claimed that “This was happening long before the white man 
appeared on the scene,” and besides, “The meaning of sovereignty is not very clear to primitive 
peoples, especially to the Indian.” Echoing Parkman and Bancroft, Gifford compared the 
Seminoles to the natural landscape of Florida, both of which stood in the way of civilization, 
such as the endangered royal palm, destined to pass “on like the Seminole into the realm of the 
past…All these and lots of other things that formed the Florida of yesterday must no doubt in 
time fall before the juggernaut of modern progress.” Gifford goes on to note how little the 
Seminole people liked to work, how much they liked to drink liquor, and how “remarkable” it 
was that Chief Bowlegs could sign his name.8 Here is the same paradox displayed by Moore-
Willson and Coe of supposed sympathy, combined with over-simplified condescension and 
racial evaluations in discussions of the Seminoles’ history and culture. 
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John Parrish, John Akin, and the Tribal Council 
Battling the Seminoles (1930) by John Parrish is a relatively similar book to Canova’s 
Life and Adventures in South Florida, with a sympathetic tone reminiscent also of the works by 
Coe and Moore-Willson. Parrish relates a series of individual stories as they were told to him 
over the course of many years by an old acquaintance named John Akin, who acted as an Army 
scout during the Third Seminole War. So like Canova’s book, Battling the Seminoles is not a full 
history of the war or Seminole culture, but contains personal vignettes of Indian fighting 
adventures, and was not recorded in print until many years later. Parrish did not relate any 
information from Akin regarding the opening attack of the war or the alleged banana plant 
episode. An account that is provided in the book offers details of an event not found in print 
anywhere else, but was supposedly common knowledge to Akin and other Florida settlers in the 
late nineteenth century. Akin told Parrish of a Seminole tribal council meeting that was held in 
the fall of 1855 “on the east side of Taylor’s Creek north-east of Lake Okeechobee,” and was 
attended by all of the different branches of the tribe. At this council meeting, the decision was 
made to attack the army surveying parties when an opportunity presented itself. A young war 
chief named Tiger was the most adamant, while Chipco was the lone chief who opposed the use 
of violence, according to Akin. This account represents the first interpretation since Canova’s 
which offered an alternative explanation for the Seminoles’ motivation behind the attack on 
Hartsuff’s team. Although Akin pointed to the tension between the Indians and settlers over the 
issue of cattle as being the primary cause behind the Seminoles’ decision to wage war, he simply 
may not have been aware of the multitude of other factors at play.9  
                                                 
9 Parrish, Battling the Seminoles, 215-218. 
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Considering Parrish’s work a piece of reliable history is at least as questionable as taking 
Canova’s book at face value. But the notion of a council decision made prior to the 
commencement of open hostilities provides a logical explanation, especially since the occurrence 
of tribal meetings held to discuss important matters was common knowledge to most everyone in 
North America in the nineteenth century. In fact, Canova twice in his book makes off-hand 
remarks about his fellow volunteer soldiers “calling a council of war” before making certain 
decisions about their course of action.10 In addition, the discovery by Hartsuff’s unit that all of 
the Indian villages in the area of the Big Cypress Swamp had been relocated prior to the winter 
dry season of 1855-1856 suggests that they were likely all aware of the coming bloodshed. 
Although the work by Parrish contains clearly exaggerated passages, sensationalized accounts, 
and factual errors, those same factors have not prevented Canova’s work from being trusted by 
most historians. And while both books are problematic as dependable sources of history, 
Parrish’s council decision account seems much more probable than Canova’s, though few 
subsequent historians have taken Battling the Seminoles into account in their research on the 
topic.  
The next three books to be published that included analysis of the opening of the Third 
Seminole War were all local histories focused on various portions of the extreme southern tip of 
Florida, but they were quite different from one another. Manatee County, Florida, which sits just 
south of Tampa Bay and north of Charlotte Harbor, was the topic of choice for Lillie McDuffee 
in The Lures of the Manatee: A True Story of South Florida’s Glamourous Past, published in 
1933. McDuffee’s work lacks citations and is written in the style of personal reminiscences as 
                                                 
10 Canova, Life and Adventures, 41, 91.  
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told to her by members of Manatee County’s community. She writes of “memorable visits” made 
by Chief Bowlegs to families in the area that have “been preserved through these nearly three 
generations.”11 When addressing the outbreak of violence in 1855, McDuffee paraphrases 
Canova’s account and even increases the amount of descriptive language when referring to 
Bowlegs’ banana garden, calling it, “treasured,” “prolific,” “magnificent,” and “handsome,” 
“with abundant delicious fruit – that would provide a treat for all the little Seminoles of Big 
Cypress.”12  
Although sympathetic to the Seminoles’ history of conflict, McDuffee still defined their 
condition in terms that white American capitalists of the early twentieth century could 
understand when she stated that Bowlegs’ “garden represented the best of the Indians’ meager 
possessions.” And she did not hesitate to employ the typical Indian war imagery common in the 
dime novels of the era, claiming that with Bowlegs’ “burning hatred,” “he made ready for his 
revenge. The pot of paint was once more brought out – a frenzied dance perhaps – and a chorus 
of war whoops and the march was on.” Inverting the traditional hero/villain dichotomy, with 
McDuffee’s account, the Indian Chief is the hero, since, “Billy Bowlegs was very human and 
had a keen perception of justice and injustice.” But, the villain(s) was certainly not the early 
settlers of Manatee County, whose history McDuffee was glamourizing, but rather the unnamed 
federal troops, who “seemingly regarded the Indian as being devoid of feeling or pride,” and 
deserved the convenient brunt of the blame for inciting the wrath of the Seminoles.13  
                                                 
11 Lillie Brown McDuffee, The Lures of Manatee: A True Story of South Florida's Glamourous Past (Nashville, TN: 
Marshall & Bruce Co., 1933), 88.  
12 Ibid., 90.  
13 Ibid. McDuffee also incorrectly states that “In the early morning hours of Christmas Eve,” the Seminoles “reached 
the fort and made their memorable attack.” But the attack occurred on December 20 in the Big Cypress swamp, and 
did not occur at any fort.   
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 Journalist, environmentalist, and free-lance writer Marjory Stoneman Douglas penned an 
influential work with her 1947 book The Everglades: River of Grass. Douglas dedicated much of 
her long life to preserving and protecting the Everglades from various drainage attempts, and The 
Everglades is clearly an attempt to draw attention to the region’s importance and rich history. 
Douglas’ work is fairly well-researched, though lacking direct citations, and her prose has a 
professional tone, and does not contain any of the typical “savage” Indian imagery. She covers 
the interwar years quite extensively (1843-1854) before relying on the banana plant account to 
explain the opening of the war. Douglas erroneously claimed that Canova was among Hartsuff’s 
ambushed unit, and does not offer much of her own assessment except to note that it was a 
“trivial depredation” that caused Bowlegs to strike.14   
In contrast to the informal writing style and locally-published works of McDuffee and 
Douglas, Lake Okeechobee: Wellspring of the Everglades (1948) by Alfred J. and Kathryn A. 
Hanna represents more deeply researched scholarship. The prolific husband and wife historical 
writing team provide much broad context to the history of the Lake Okeechobee region, 
especially regarding national politics and economics. A major focus of this work is on the 
various drainage and reclamation efforts involving Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades swamp, 
but the authors also address national expansion, the politics of slavery, and the impact that the 
Armed Occupation Act of 1845 and the Swamp Land Act of 1850 had on the settlement of the 
state by white Americans. The Hannas also detailed the years leading up to the Third Seminole 
War in a more clear and complete way than any authors had done up to that point in time. The 
years of removal negotiations, surveying schemes, trade restriction tactics, the accumulation of 
                                                 
14 Marjory Stoneman Douglas, The Everglades: River of Grass (New York: Rinehart, 1947), 264. 
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troops in South Florida, and the problems between the Seminoles and Creeks in Indian Territory 
are all analyzed by the authors. But, rather than build a case that some combination of these 
factors led to the fighting, they relied completely on the banana destruction account, calling it 
“one of those needless acts of vandalism that never should have occurred.”15 It is interesting to 
note that twenty-two out of the twenty-three sources listed by the authors at the end of the 
chapter are found in governmental archives, with the lone exception being Canova’s Life and 
Adventures in South Florida.  
 In 1949, newspaper and magazine editor Karl Grismer published The Story of Fort 
Myers: The History of the Land of the Caloosahatchee and Southwest Florida. Grismer wrote 
several other city histories during his career, including books on Sarasota and St. Petersburg, 
Florida, and Kent, Ohio. The Story of Fort Myers is written from the perspective of the early 
white settlers in the area and relays the bitterness directed towards the federal government and its 
seemingly ineffectual policies with regards to removing the perceived Seminole menace. 
Grismer’s book is an unsympathetic take and is peppered with unabashed bigotry, evidenced by 
his statement that, “Unquestionably the Indians had countless faults and many vices. They were 
not particularly loveable characters.”16 The author’s own biases actually parallel the racism of 
the 1850s that he was writing about, and in the process, he may have unintentionally provided a 
quite accurate representation of the sentiments that early white Florida settlers had towards 
Native Americans. Grismer addresses the years and factors preceding the war in a similar 
                                                 
15 Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Lake Okeechobee, Wellspring of the Everglades (Indianapolis, 
IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948), 63.  
16 Karl H. Grismer, The Story of Fort Myers: The History of the Land of the Caloosahatchee and Southwest Florida 
(St. Petersburg, FL: St. Petersburg Print Co., 1949), 59.  
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manner to the Hannas, but he is more adamant that the government intentionally desired the 
Seminoles to “be goaded into warfare” by its harassing tactics.  
 Regarding Grismer’s analysis of the third war and the destruction of Bowlegs’ bananas, 
the writer went to somewhat extreme lengths in order to embellish Canova’s account, perhaps 
influenced by his background in journalism. “‘Let’s tear the hell out of it and see what Billy 
does,’ yelled one of the men,” claimed Grismer. In addition to bananas, Grismer asserts that the 
soldiers “smashed the pumpkins growing nearby and uprooted the potatoes,” and when the 
Seminole Chief demanded compensation, the troops “tripped Billy and sent him sprawling. 
When he arose, his face was covered with dirt.”17 None of this is mentioned in Canova’s book, or 
in any source for that matter, with the exception of Bowlegs allegedly confronting Hartsuff and 
demanding some form of compensation from the soldiers.  The claim that Hartsuff’s men 
physically accosted the chief is not found in writing anywhere else, not even in Canova’s 
account. Perhaps Grismer’s preference for sensationalism over objective accuracy was simply an 
attempt to sell books since it has been noted by his biographer that the Great Depression struck 
Grismer rather hard, and forced him to pursue several different career paths in his lifetime.18 
Despite relying on the banana plant account and trusting its accuracy unequivocally, just like 
every other author before him, Grismer did make a more unique and significant claim when he 
wrote that, “There is no doubt but that the Indians would have gone on the warpath again even if 
the wanton destruction of Billy’s banana patch had not occurred.”19 Here is the logical leap of 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 69.  
18 Scott Taylor Hartzell, Remembering St. Petersburg, Florida: Sunshine City Stories (Charleston, SC: History 
Press, 2006), 46.   
19 Grismer, The Story of Fort Myers, 60. 
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speculation that most authors have been unwilling to make, which would effectively make the 
accuracy of Canova’s account a moot point.  
 In addition to the reliance on Canova’s work to explain the outbreak of the Third 
Seminole War, most of the works analyzed so far also have in common the fact that they were 
not focused exclusively on the war itself, but rather on topics which were peripheral to the 
conflict. As highlighted by Mikaela Adam’s essay, many works of fiction and nonfiction in the 
early twentieth century addressed the Seminoles in general, and most often the Second Seminole 
War, but only the few works analyzed here contain any discussion of the Third War. The goal of 
Coe and Moore-Willson was to inspire sympathy in order to obtain land for the Florida 
Seminoles. Gifford’s book was mostly a reprint of the Harper’s Weekly article detailing 
Bowlegs’ trip to New Orleans, peppered with his scientific racist observations. McDuffee, 
Douglas, the Hannas, and Grismer provided local histories of slightly different regions of South 
Florida, and as such, the Seminole Wars were not their primary focus. This trend would only 
continue with author after author simply plugging Canova’s account into whatever specific 
historical topic they happen to be emphasizing. 
 The following three works actually do have the Seminole people as their primary topic, 
but all three are more concerned with the tribe’s contemporary cultural makeup than with their 
history of warfare with the United States. Herpetologist Wilfred T. Neill’s The Story of Florida’s 
Seminole Indians (1956) offers a very brief and simplified history of the third war, which the 
author interestingly refers to as “The Third Seminole Uprising.” He attempted to stimulate 
sympathy with his audience when he related the banana plant story by stating that, “We may 
imagine the emotions that filled the breasts of the chieftain and his people. They had been hunted 
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from place to place, declared outlaws…and now, this further indignity was thrust upon them.”20 
Neill does not address any broader context for the events that led to the war, and his readers are 
left to assume that the “Third Seminole Uprising” was fought for the sole purpose of avenging 
the indignity of the vandalism to Bowlegs’ garden. 
 Archaeologist and historian Irvin Peithmann contributed The Unconquered Seminole 
Indians: Pictorial History of the Seminole Indians to the historiography in 1957. Despite a 
mostly positive endorsement from a young reviewer named James Covington, who would later 
distinguish himself as among the most prominent historians of the Florida Seminoles, 
Peithmann’s work displayed the typical shortcomings of writings on the Third Seminole War. 
Peithmann provided short vignettes of episodes during both the Second and Third Seminole 
Wars, but did so out of chronological order, which makes the progression of events difficult for 
readers for trace. One of his sections contains the banana plant story, which he paraphrases 
slightly from Canova’s version, as most authors before him had done. Peithmann authored 
several works on the history of American Indians during his career, but Covington characterizes 
Peithmann’s use of the term “half-breed” as “unwise,” and notes that the term had not been used 
by modern writers for some time.21 Equally unsettling is a statement such as the following, 
referring to the reasons why white Americans wanted the Seminoles removed from Florida: “It 
was beyond their understanding that the government wanted them to leave and give new lands 
elsewhere on which to live.” So, even without employing terms such as “savage” or “ignoble,” 
                                                 
20 Wilfred T. Neill, The Story of Florida's Seminole Indians (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors, 1964), 23. 
21 James W. Covington, review of The Unconquered Seminole Indians, by Irvin M. Peithmann, Florida Historical 
Quarterly 36, no. 2 (October 1957): 171.  
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Peithmann still portrayed Native Americans as inherently intellectually inferior, and even 
explicitly stated that the Seminoles “seemed to want no part of white man’s civilization.”22 
 The third of these similar offerings is Wyatt Blassingame’s Seminoles of Florida (1959), 
which also focuses on the tribe’s cultural features but still contains discussion of the three wars. 
Blassingame was an eclectic and prolific writer who authored many short stories, essays, 
juvenile books, novels, and works of history, including biographies on Osceola and Ponce de 
Leon, in addition to his book on the Florida Seminoles. Regarding his treatment of the Third 
Seminole War, Blassingame ignored all events and factors that preceded the conflict, and moved 
directly from the close of the Second Seminole War to the familiar banana plant story. The books 
by Neill, Peithmann, and Blassingame illustrate that even by the 1950s many Americans were 
still being introduced to the existence of the Florida Seminoles, and the popular fascination with 
their cultural makeup and tribal customs may have prevented authors such as these from fully 
analyzing the documentary evidence regarding their history of warfare.  
   
Additional Highly Questionable Versions of the Banana Plant Story 
The following three works contain highly questionable versions of the banana plant 
account, and while they have been largely dismissed and ignored by most scholars, they deserve 
analysis here, if for no other reason than to highlight the uncertainty surrounding the time period 
and events in question. Works such as these are difficult to evaluate, but all three highlight the 
problems associated with relying on word-of-mouth stories passed down through generations.  
                                                 
22 Irvin M. Peithmann, The Unconquered Seminole Indians: Pictorial History of the Seminole Indians (St. 
Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Association, 1957), 44. 
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In 1957, the “duly elected Chief and Historian” of the tiny Florida Choctaw band (less 
than one hundred members), Horace G, Ridaught, published Hell’s Branch Office, for the 
purpose of correcting “the scanty and often inaccurate references made to this little band of 
Choctaw Indians in our history books.”23 Ridaught claims to have received most of his 
information from his grandmother, who lived through both the Second and Third Seminole 
Wars, and saw her husband and other family members fight alongside the United States against 
the Seminoles.   
 According to Ridaught’s grandfather, the opening of the Third Seminole War occurred 
under entirely different circumstances than any other account has made known. Supposedly, 
Hartsuff had prearranged a meeting with Billy Bowlegs under the pretense of offering the chief a 
“reward for good behavior.” On their way to the rendezvous at Bowlegs’ (abandoned) village, 
Hartsuff and his men burned down the U.S. forts in the area for the purpose of framing the 
Seminoles. And when the Indians made their appearance, “The little company of men opened 
fire, without warning, catching the unsuspecting Indians by surprise…The only Indian shots fired 
was [sic] directed at the leader of this shameful ruse, Lieutenant Hartsoff (sic).”24 Ridaught 
claims that his grandfather was a “disinterested eye witness” to the events, but was “deemed 
unworthy to testify in any matter, according to the law of land.”25 While the Ridaught family’s 
account clearly contains many problems and unanswered questions, the author is correct to point 
out that no known written sources have survived from that era other than those authored by white 
Americans. Unfortunately, Hell’s Branch Office is so plagued by factual, spelling, and 
                                                 
23 Horace G. Ridaught, Hell’s Branch Office (Citra, FL.: Privately printed, 1957), introduction. Ridaught claims that 
the Florida Choctaw band consisted of eighty-nine members in 1955, but they are not federally recognized, nor does 
any written evidence exist that confirms their continued residence in the state besides his book.  
24 Ridaught, Hell’s Branch Office, 143.  
25 Ibid.  
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grammatical errors, combined with the author’s lack of research and obvious liberties taken, that 
most of the arguments in the book are wholly unconvincing in any way, and subsequent authors 
have probably been wise to disregard Ridaught’s accounts.  
D.B. McKay was a highly influential civic leader in Tampa during the early decades of 
the twentieth century. McKay served two terms as Tampa’s mayor, like his uncle and 
grandfather before him, owned and published the Tampa Times newspaper, acted as Director of 
the First National Bank, and was one of the founders of the University of Tampa.26 For twelve 
years the Tampa Times featured a column titled “Pioneer Florida,” which contained historical 
vignettes and personal anecdotes on a range of Florida topics, authored by many different 
writers. McKay compiled the articles into book form and published Pioneer Florida in 1959, 
complete with his own editorial comments. In a section that contains several stories related to the 
Third Seminole War, McKay reprinted a letter written by a Miss E. Panchita Kendrick “about 
1856.” Prefacing this letter, McKay notes that “There are many – and wildly divergent – stories 
of the origin – the provocation – of the last war with the Seminole Indians in Florida. The official 
report is to the effect that it was caused by the unprovoked attack by followers of Chief Billy 
Bowlegs on a scouting party of regular army troops…Another, which was widely current among 
the pioneers, was that a party of army engineers on a spree invaded the plantation of old Bowlegs 
and maliciously destroyed many fine fruit trees.”27 It is initially unclear what other 
interpretations McKay is referring to when he states that there are “many” origin stories, since he 
admits that the official records indicate the attack was unprovoked, and virtually every other 
                                                 
26 Biographical note in the Donald Brenham "D.B." McKay Collection, University of South Florida Libraries, 
http://digital.lib.usf.edu/SFS0036137/00001 (accessed November 10, 2014).  
27 Donald Brenham McKay, Pioneer Florida (Tampa, FL: Southern Pub. Co, 1959), 561. 
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source written since then refers to the banana plant account as the direct cause. But the letter 
from Miss Kendrick contains a version of events not found in print anywhere else.  
Miss Panchita Kendrick was the daughter of W.H. Kendrick and a cousin of John T. 
Lesley, both of whom fought in Florida’s volunteer militia during the Third Seminole War. Miss 
Kendrick’s letter is a good example of a source that was likely assembled using a combination of 
written reports and word-of-mouth information. She begins by describing Bowlegs’ village and 
garden but makes no mention of banana plants or any damage done to them by the U.S. troops, 
which is not surprising considering she was writing during the war, and three decades before 
Canova’s version of the events came to light. But Kendrick’s account is arguably even more 
shocking and questionable than Canova’s. She claims that “Lieutenant Hartsuff with 10 men left 
Fort Myers with the intention to visit Billy Bowlegs’ garden, and if the chief was there share his 
hospitality for the night and return the next day. Billy being absent,” the team started back to 
Fort Myers, set up camp for the night, and then “some 25 or 30 of the Billy Bowlegs Indians 
made their appearance. They were apparently delighted to see Lieutenant Hartsuff and showed 
him every mark of kindness and respect.” Before proceeding any further, several problems with 
her account are already notable. For one, we know that Hartsuff had orders to survey the entire 
area over the course of several weeks and make reports regarding the whereabouts of the 
Seminoles, not to visit only Bowlegs’ village in order to “share his hospitality.” In addition, it 
seems quite unlikely that the Seminoles would have been kind and respectful to the troops 
considering that the Indians had burned down the newly constructed forts in the vicinity and 
relocated their towns to more remote areas of the Big Cypress Swamp.  
43 
 
Kendrick goes on to assert that Hartsuff “had a demijohn of whiskey, with which he 
anticipated making them so communicative that he could ascertain what course they intended to 
pursue in relation to a proposition made them by the United States government to move to 
Arkansas. The Indians imbibed pretty freely, dancing and carousing until nearly daylight. Then 
Lieutenant Hartsuff, believing that he discovered some signs of hostility,” destroyed the 
remainder of the whiskey. “But this made matters worse, and so exasperated them that they 
commenced an indiscriminate firing upon the camp.”28 Despite this assertion, according to 
government records, Hartsuff was not authorized to negotiate with the Seminoles, but was 
ordered to explore the area, and that Indian Agent “Casey will take care of Indian affairs.”29 
Kendrick’s explanation of a drunken negotiation attempt gone wrong is an obvious 
embellishment, and was likely augmented by the rumors and gossip contributed by her Indian-
fighting kin. It is interesting that her account of the event did not gain the traction that Canova’s 
did, presumably due to the lack of publication, or else this thesis might be refuting a slightly 
different version of the same episode.   
Albert DeVane was an amateur historian and a life-long friend to many of the Florida 
Seminoles from the time of his introduction to Billy Bowlegs III in 1917, until his death in 1969. 
The writings of DeVane are particularly difficult to analyze because he never actually produced a 
single published work. Instead, after his death, the Sebring Historical Society collected and 
compiled his writings and notes into book form and titled it DeVane’s Early Florida History 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 561-562.  
29 Colonel Harvey Brown to Lieutenant George Hartsuff, December 5, 1855, Letters Sent, Registers of Letters 
Received, and Letters Received by Headquarters, Troops in Florida, and Headquarters, Department of Florida, 
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(1978). The book’s introduction notes its many faults: repetitive topics, manuscripts with missing 
pages, letters with no replies, and a large portion of the book is simply a collection of other 
authors’ writings merely transcribed and reprinted. The reproduction of primary source materials 
serves as a useful tool for researchers, but otherwise the book lacks any semblance of consistent 
themes or interpretations. Included in it are fragments of military correspondences, portions of 
works by Alexander Webb, Francis Boggess, and John Parrish, and sections of other historians’ 
writings, such as James Covington, D.B. McKay, and Ray Seley, Jr., all of whom DeVane was in 
communication with.30 Historians would seek out DeVane for his personal knowledge of the 
Florida Seminoles’ family lineage and their history and culture since the early twentieth century. 
Also included in the book are writings by Park DeVane, Albert’s brother, as well as journalist 
Wesley Stout.  
The DeVane brothers were actually in contact with Ray Seley, Jr. in the early 1960s 
while he was writing his article that refuted Canova’s account, “Lieutenant Hartsuff and the 
Banana Plants.” Park DeVane accompanied Seley, Jr. as the two searched for the actual location 
of the Seminole attack on Hartsuff’s unit. Seley, Jr. used this archaeological assessment of the 
area to support his claim that the Seminole war party was likely not even aware of what may 
have occurred at Bowlegs’ garden. Nevertheless, Park DeVane wrote an article which is mostly a 
reprint of Seley, Jr.’s work, in which the author declared that he was still “of the opinion that the 
banana plants were destroyed and the incident did cause the Indians to retaliate.” Park DeVane 
goes on to assert that even the modern Seminoles knew “The true story of this attack,” and 
concludes that “It is likely that Hartsuff accomplished exactly what they wanted by drawing a 
                                                 
30 The Works of Webb, Boggess, Parrish, Covington, McKay, and Seley, Jr. are all discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis.  
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fight from the Indians.”31 Park DeVane’s insistence on the accuracy of the banana plant theory 
might be one of the best pieces of supporting evidence available in favor of Canova’s account 
due to the DeVane brothers’ personal relationship with modern Seminoles. But the fact that 
Florida Seminoles were aware of the banana plant story by the 1950s or 1960s is not strong 
enough evidence on its own to confirm the account.  
 
The Literature: 1960-Present 
 In 1962, Fred Wallace published an article that focused on an important peripheral 
element of the Third Seminole War with “The Story of Captain John C. Casey.” Wallace was an 
amateur historian, and the life story of Casey was his “pet project.”32 Casey played an integral 
role in the removal of the Florida Seminoles in the 1850s, and his strong personal friendship with 
Chief Bowlegs is a central feature of Wallace’s essay. Despite Wallace’s sparse use of citations, 
it is clear that he utilized Canova’s account when he wrote of “wanton vandalism” done to 
Bowlegs’ “home,” and its role in sparking the war. Wallace downplays the fighting entirely 
though when he asserts that “No engagements of importance took place.”33 Wallace is yet 
another author whose scope of topic prevented him from fully analyzing the attack on Hartsuff’s 
crew, but who still insisted on including the garden vandalism interpretation to explain the cause 
of the war.  
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32 Back Matter: Florida Historical Quarterly 41, no. 2 (October 1962).  
33 Fred W. Wallace, “The Story of Captain John C. Casey,” Florida Historical Quarterly 41, no. 2 (October 1962), 
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After years of authors employing the banana plant story in their writings while focusing 
primarily on various other aspects of Seminole history, an amateur historian named Ray B. 
Seley, Jr. came along and made the banana plant story the sole focus of his research. “Lieutenant 
Hartsuff and the Banana Plants” (1963) was published in Tequesta and Seley, Jr.’s impetus for 
writing this piece was explicitly to discover the accuracy of Canova’s tale. Seley, Jr. utilized the 
military records concerning troop movements in Florida almost exclusively, and offered a 
detailed analysis of the surviving soldiers’ official eyewitness reports. His investigation 
concludes that regardless of the truth behind the American soldiers’ theft and/or destruction of 
Bowlegs’ bananas, the attacking Seminoles would not have been aware of their actions due to 
their likely route to the scene of ambush. He concluded that the Seminoles had already decided 
upon an assault on the patrolling U.S. soldiers prior to their visit to Bowlegs’ abandoned village.  
Although Seley, Jr. flatly refutes the banana plant story as the cause of the war, the majority of 
subsequent authors have not taken a cue from his study, and many continue to ignore the need to 
reevaluate the source materials and prevailing interpretations regarding the Third Seminole War. 
Some authors have even used Seley, Jr.’s essay to further promote the banana theory, with a few 
even citing “Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants” as their primary source. Rather than 
instigating a new trend of fuller interpretations, Seley, Jr. seems to have unwittingly reinforced 
and continued the trend of relying on Canova’s account.  Reminiscent of Lillie McDuffee’s 
informal writing style, and similar in scope to the Hanna’s Lake Okeechobee, is Lawrence Will’s 
Cracker History of Okeechobee; “Custard Apple, Moonvine, Catfish and Moonshine” (1964). 
Will covers a range of loosely-related topics, and includes his discussion of the opening of the 
Third Seminole War in a chapter titled “Sam Colt’s Famous Six Guns,” which notes the soldiers’ 
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initial usage of the famous firearms during the Second Seminole War. Will included in his work 
the banana plant account as the direct cause of the Third Seminole War and quoted Canova more 
closely than most authors had done before him.34    
 Historian Kenneth W. Porter, best known for his book The Black Seminoles: History of a 
Freedom-Seeking People (1996), penned a biographical essay on Bowlegs in 1967. In “Billy 
Bowlegs (Holata Micco) in the Seminole Wars,” Porter traces the chief’s life from his first 
appearance in the written record during the Second Seminole War until his death in Indian 
Territory. His article contains extensive citations of a wide range of sources, but Porter does not 
provide any references for his paragraph that discusses the banana plant destruction and the 
attack on Hartsuff’s unit. Although he did not mention Canova by name, he did attribute the 
account to “a member of the party” that was ambushed, which of course is not accurate. Porter 
considered the actions of the Florida Seminoles as only postponing the inevitability of removal, 
and he speculated that Bowlegs “was determined to die fighting, or at any rate not to leave his 
home without a last fight,” before admitting that his reasons are not fully known.35 In a similar 
manner as the assessment of Fred Wallace, Porter contends that the Third Seminole War “was 
almost entirely lacking in the drama of the Second or even the First.”36   
 Florida historian George C. Bittle contributed to the historiography a brief article titled 
“Florida Frontier Incidents during the 1850s” (1970), which details some of the exploits of 
Florida’s militia companies before and during the war. When referring to the opening attack of 
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the war, Bittle cites Canova’s work as “the official account of this episode.”37 Interestingly, 
Bittle utilized Canova’s Life and Adventures primarily for its extensive accounts of day-to-day 
life in the Florida militia, which is arguably Canova’s more valuable contribution and his book’s 
most useful asset to scholars.  
 
Charlton Tebeau 
 Unlike many of the authors analyzed thus far, Charlton Tebeau (1904-2000) was a 
distinguished and celebrated historian. At various times during his long career, Tebeau served as 
chairman of the Department of History at the University of Miami (Florida), president of the 
Florida Historical Society, and editor of Tequesta, in addition to authoring more than ten works 
of history centered on Florida’s past. What is so noteworthy about Tebeau regarding 
interpretations of the Third Seminole War, is that early in his career, in his book Florida’s Last 
Frontier: The History of Collier County (1957), he relied entirely on Canova’s banana plant 
account when he addressed the opening of the conflict. But the next time that Tebeau’s research 
and writing returned him to that familiar territory, he did not settle for the typical interpretation. 
Instead, he took heed of Ray Seley, Jr.’s essay which refuted Canova’s theory, and even 
addressed the debate directly in the text of his book, Florida From Indian Trail to Space Age: A 
History (1965). Tebeau noted that the study undertaken by Seley, Jr. “seems to correct the oft-
told story that Hartsuff’s men stripped the leaves from banana plants in Bowlegs’ garden ‘to see 
the old man cut up,’” but unfortunately, few other authors seemed to be paying attention to the 
debate. And, in his acclaimed work, A History of Florida (1971), Tebeau completely disregarded 
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any mention of the alleged banana plant incident, and instead relied only on primary sources 
contemporaneous with the war, including the written correspondences of U.S. military officers 
and local newspapers. Elsewhere in the book, Tebeau mentions Canova, and notes that he was 
“well known” for telling “tall tales,”38 perhaps a subtle allusion to the banana plant tale which 
Tebeau was now confident enough to ignore completely.  They Called it Fogartyville: A Story 
of the Fogartys and Fogartyville (1972), by Ollie Z. Fogarty, is a local and family history 
centered on the frontier period of South Florida. Although Fogarty provides a brief bibliography, 
he does not offer direct citations, and even warns his readers that “Some fiction has been used to 
connect the many bits and pieces of facts into a composite picture, a word mosaic of history.”39 
While this admission likely disqualifies the book for consideration as serious scholarship, it is 
still noteworthy for its mention of the banana garden incident. Fogarty does not list Canova in his 
bibliography though, but instead, Lillie McDuffee’s The Lures of the Manatee (1933) is listed, 
and is the only one of his sources that contains the account. Like McDuffee, Fogarty employs the 
familiar imagery of the savage Indian by stating that the destruction of Chief Bowlegs’ garden 
caused “furious resentment among the Seminoles,” as they “donned their war paint” and 
embarked on a “reign of terror.” Fogarty even adds a new twist to the tale by claiming that 
following Bowlegs’ demand for compensation, the American soldiers “rudely tripped him, 
laughing uproariously at the discomfiture of the proud warrior.”40  
 Historical archaeologist Charles H. Fairbanks briefly analyzed the three Seminole wars in 
his book, The Florida Seminole People (1973), which is much more focused on the anthropology 
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of the tribe than on military and political issues. Nevertheless, in one short paragraph devoted to 
the Third War, he includes the banana plant story, before summarizing the entire conflict as 
“inconclusive.”41 Fairbanks’ work lacks citations and was likely intended for a broad audience, 
but his brief bibliography includes Moore-Willson’s The Seminoles of Florida as the only source 
containing the banana plant account. So, like Fogarty, Fairbanks relied solely on secondary 
literature, without consulting Canova’s text itself, let alone any actual primary sources.  
 Prominent Florida historian and recognized expert on the Seminole and Miccosukee 
Tribes of Florida, Harry A, Kersey, Jr., contributed Pelts, Plumes, and Hides: White Traders 
among the Seminole Indians, 1870-1930 (1975) to the literature on the Florida Seminoles. 
Although it represents excellent scholarship and was well-received by the community of 
historians, Pelts, Plumes, and Hides suffers the same drawback as many other books when it 
comes to addressing the Third Seminole War: that conflict is not the main focus of the study, and 
as such, receives little of the analysis and primary source research that his main topics receive. 
Kersey supported the banana plant account and referenced three secondary sources in his 
citations: Kenneth Porter’s “Billy Bowlegs in the Seminole Wars,” John Gifford’s Billy Bowlegs 
and the Seminole War, and Ray B. Seley, Jr., Jr.’s, “Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana Plants,” 
although Seley, Jr.’s piece explicitly refutes the garden incident as the cause of the war.   
 One of the first attempts to offer a full history of all three Seminole wars was provided by 
anthropologist Virginia Bergman Peters with her book The Florida Wars (1979). The majority of 
Peters’ work is focused on the Second War, perhaps appropriately so, but, as renowned Seminole 
war historian John Mahon notes in a book review, “Since no full history of the Third Seminole 
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War has ever been printed, it is disappointing to find the treatment here so lean.”42 Peters’ 
paragraph on the opening Seminole attack is virtually identical to all those that came before, and 
includes the oft-used line from Canova’s work which posits that Hartsuff’s men destroyed 
Bowlegs’ garden “just to see how old Billy would cut up.” Peters cites this quotation directly as 
being found in “government records,” but she does not specify which records. However, the 
banana garden story is not found in any government sources, and certainly not the quotation 
about “how old Billy would cut up,” yet there are several other works listed in her bibliography 
which do contain Canova’s account, including Coe’s Red Patriots, and Porter’s “Billy Bowlegs 
in the Seminole Wars.” 
Florida historian and historic preservation specialist Janet Snyder Matthews provided a 
thoroughly researched and detailed account of South Florida frontier history with Edge of 
Wilderness: A Settlement History of Manatee River and Sarasota Bay 1528-1885 (1983). 
Matthews devotes an entire chapter to the interwar war years in Florida (1843-1854), and places 
special emphasis on the outbreaks of violence in 1849 and in 1850 and the relationship between 
Chief Bowlegs and Captain Casey that is often credited for (temporarily) forestalling further 
bloodshed. The author then shifts her focus back and forth between the political maneuvering 
that was taking place in the state legislature and in Washington D.C., and the localized events 
taking place in South Florida as the U.S. military increased its non-violent pressure. Although 
one reviewer contended that Matthews’ work has more appeal as a reference volume than as 
interpretive history,43 and while she often lets her plethora of sources speak for themselves, she 
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makes logical leaps of interpretation as well, such as her assertion that the Seminoles “were well 
aware” that the increased military activity meant that their forced removal from the state was 
likely imminent.44   
Regarding Matthews’ treatment of the Seminole attack on Hartsuff’s crew, she omits any 
mention of Canova’s banana plant story in the primary text, and instead provides a matter-of-fact 
account based solely on the primary military records. However, in the endnotes she offers an 
explicit discussion of the “oft-told tale.” Matthews quotes Covington’s assessment of the unclear 
evidence regarding Hartsuff’s men and Bowlegs’ garden, and then concludes that regardless of 
the soldiers’ fruit-motivated actions, “It would appear there was far more at issue for the chief 
than…violated bananas.”45 Another interesting aspect of Matthews’ work is her use of Canova’s 
Life and Adventures in South Florida as a reference source, but only for his descriptions of either 
daily life in the Florida militia or the physical attributes of the landscape, whereas most authors 
mention his banana plant account and naught else.  
The following three works are narrower in scope, and all focus on writings of participants 
and observers during the Third Seminole War. The first is a reprinted soldier’s diary written 
during the war, edited by history professor David Ramsey, who also provides a few pages of 
introductory information before letting the memoir speak for itself. In “Abner Doubleday and the 
Third Seminole War” (1981), Ramsey includes the familiar banana garden account, and 
attributes his source to Porter’s “Billy Bowlegs in the Seminole Wars,” and Covington’s “An 
Episode in the Third Seminole War,” the latter of which actually does not contain any mention of 
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the banana plant story. A similar piece was written by Patricia Wickman titled “‘A Trifling 
Affair:’ Loomis Langdon and the Third Seminole War” (1985), in which she reprinted and 
analyzed an ex-soldier’s writings. Wickman traces the military career of Lieutenant Loomis 
Langdon, a West Point classmate of George Hartsuff’s, and included in her article a brief 
passage about the garden vandalism that “sparked the final conflict.”46 She cites Canova as well 
as Seley, Jr. Jr. and Porter’s piece on Bowlegs for the banana account, but virtually every other 
source utilized by Wickman were primary documents, the latest of which being Langdon’s own 
memoirs written in 1899. This suggests that she felt compelled to include the standard 
interpretation rather than letting the primary evidence stand on its own. Yet another similar essay 
that contains a transcribed original document is Gary Mormino’s “The Firing of Guns and 
Crackers Continued Till Light: A Diary of the Billy Bowlegs War” (1985). Mormino reprints 
portions of a diary written by an unknown settler who lived in Tampa during the war, and 
includes in his introductory comments the banana plant account. Mormino cites Seley, Jr.’s 
article as his source, which, again, is the one written piece that is clearly a repudiation of the 
garden destruction interpretation.  
 
The Works of James Covington, 1957-1993: Recognized Florida Seminole Expert 
 James Covington is widely considered the most accomplished historian of the Florida 
Seminoles, and his book The Billy Bowlegs War: 1855-1858 The Final Stand of The Seminoles 
Against The Whites (1982) remains the only full-length monograph devoted to the Third 
Seminole War. Covington was a professor of history at the University of Tampa from 1951 to 
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1989, and a majority of his forty articles and six books are focused on the Florida branch of the 
Seminole tribe.47 Covington discusses the opening of the Third War in several of his works, but 
his failure to analyze the banana plant account in depth is a disappointment. The evolution of his 
interpretations is still noteworthy, especially the way he addresses the subject before and after 
Seley, Jr.’s article that refutes the banana plant theory, “Lieutenant Hartsuff and the Banana 
Plants” (1963). Although he did not ever use Canova’s full account in his writings, Covington 
was reluctant to abandon at least the implication that whatever happened in Bowlegs’ garden led 
to the Seminole attack.    
 In The Story of Southwestern Florida (1957), Covington uses the same set of records 
employed by Seley, Jr., the U.S. Army correspondences in Florida. Covington writes: “The 
patrol stopped at Assinwah’s Town and Billy Bowlegs’s Town and several soldiers pulled some 
bananas from Billy’s famed plants. At five-thirty A.M. on December 20, 1855, the soldiers were 
suddenly attacked”48 (My emphasis). Covington does not cite Canova, nor list Life and 
Adventures in South Florida in his bibliography, but he makes an obvious allusion to the banana 
story for those familiar with the written history. While it is true that one of the surviving soldiers, 
Private Baker, noted that when the team was scouting the Indian towns, “they saw no one there, 
[and] some of the party took a bunch of bananas,”49 the concept of the bananas being “famed” 
could have only come from Canova, or those who wrote after him. In any case, Covington did 
not rely solely on his own interpretation of the primary sources, and after Seley, Jr.’s article was 
published, he would do so even less.  
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 The next time that Covington addressed the subject was in his article “An Episode in the 
Third Seminole War” (1966). In this piece, Covington includes a discussion of the tribal council 
meeting that took place prior to the attack on Hartsuff’s men, according to Parrish’s Battling the 
Seminoles, although Covington doubted the trustworthiness of the source. But he still implies 
that the banana theft was the direct catalyst for the Seminole assault. Covington quotes Baker 
exactly, without mentioning the alleged fame of the bananas, but again, juxtaposes the banana 
story immediately before the attack, which reads as a simple case of cause and effect. 
Compounding the matter is the fact that Covington again does not let his own research stand 
alone. Rather than citing Baker and the primary records, he points readers to Seley, Jr.’s article 
for “An account of the banana stealing episode,” without mentioning that Seley, Jr.’s work 
rejects the accuracy of the banana plant story.  
 When Covington published The Billy Bowlegs War in 1982, prominent Second Seminole 
War historian John Mahon noted that the book “at long last fills a conspicuous gap in Florida 
history.”50 Covington opens the book with the attack on Hartsuff’s unit before back-tracking to 
discuss the events that led up to the war. His treatment of the banana plant account is essentially 
the same as his previous article, except this time he notes in the text that “The evidence is not 
clear that the soldiers maliciously destroyed plants belonging to Bowlegs,”51 before relating the 
particulars of the attack. Again, he cites Seley, Jr.’s article as “A good account” of the episode. 
However, if his readers are unfamiliar with the historiography on the subject, many may wonder 
exactly what unclear evidence he is alluding to regarding the possibly malicious act. So once 
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again, Covington implies that the banana plant incident played a role in the attack, while he cites 
an article which refutes that position.  
 The Seminoles of Florida (1993) represents the culmination of Covington’s years of 
research and writing on the topic, and has an ambitious scope, stretching back to the earliest 
references to Seminoles, up to modern times. His assessment of the opening attack and the 
banana plant account are mostly unchanged, except that he drops any mention of the possible 
malicious nature of the incident. This time he writes that “a private may have carried along with 
him a bunch of bananas,”52 and then discusses the attack, again citing Seley, Jr.. While The 
Seminoles of Florida was praised by at least two reviewers, historians John Mahon and Jerald 
Milanich,53 another Florida historian, Harry Kersey, took a more critical view of Covington’s 
work. Kersey wrote: “Ethnohistorians will also be concerned that there is decidedly little 
emphasis given to the Indians’ role in determining their own history. Seminoles are rarely 
portrayed as fully sentient beings; most often they are treated as the ‘other.’”54 Undoubtedly, one 
of the problems that faced Covington, and anyone else who decides to tackle the topic, is the lack 
of Seminole sources. But that means that the interpretations of historians are all the more 
important, in order to fill in some of the missing gaps with logical inferences. What Covington 
provided, however, was a compilation of events and statements, albeit impressively researched, 
which lacked sufficient analysis and interpretation.  
One of Covington’s most illuminating passages comes in an article which does not 
explicitly address the opening assault of the Third Seminole War. In “Seminole Leadership: 
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Changing Substance, 1858-1958” (1980), Covington abandons the usual military records and 
instead utilized sources more focused on Seminole culture. He wrote: 
“Decisions made by the Seminoles were group decisions which were binding upon all 
with no leader telling the others what to do. Before the so-called leader made a move, he 
consulted with persons who had influence in order to clarify his thinking or to judge how 
the matter would be received by others. Should the issue be in doubt, the decision-making 
process was delayed or ever set aside…Leaders of the tribe gathered during the Second 
Seminole War to decree a policy of death to those advocating surrender and in 1855 to 
decide that the military surveying parties should be attacked; thus starting the Third and 
final Seminole War.”55 
Here Covington provides a clear and simple interpretation of the opening of the war without 
getting too bogged down with the specifics of the primary sources, while displaying trust in the 
source of the council meeting account. The details regarding the Seminoles’ decision-making 
processes also serve to negate the suggestion that the banana plant incident was the direct 
catalyst for the Seminole attack. Despite this revelation, Covington neither refuted the banana 
garden account all together nor did he ever offer any direct analysis of the alleged incident 
himself. So the most debatable aspect of the Third Seminole War was left under-analyzed by its 
most prominent scholar.     
Gene Burnett’s Florida’s Past: People and Events That Shaped the State (1986) contains 
sixty-three individual essays written by Burnett which had previously appeared in the magazine 
Florida Trend. Burnett wrote with a journalistic flair, and mentions briefly “Chief Bill Bowlegs” 
and his “rage over the destruction of his famous banana grove,” in an essay on a young settler in 
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Sarasota.56 The author references Grismer’s The Story of Sarasota, and McDuffee’s The Lures of 
the Manatee regarding the banana plant account, continuing the trend of writers relying solely on 
secondary sources. And although Burnett’s book clearly is intended to provide anecdotal history 
vignettes rather than top-of-the-field historical scholarship, it is noteworthy since it illustrates the 
entrenchment and dissemination of the banana plant account.  
Anthropologist Merwyn Garbarino has written several books on the culture and history of 
the Florida Seminoles, including one simply titled The Seminole (1989). In it, Garbarino devotes 
one brief paragraph to the Third Seminole War, but does not provide a direct citation of her 
source for the “pillaged” garden account.57    
 Florida native Canter Brown, Jr. has written extensively on Florida history, and his book 
Florida’s Peace River Frontier (1991) contains a full chapter devoted to the Third Seminole 
War. Brown is one of the few authors, along with Covington, to include in his work the account 
found in Parrish’s Battling the Seminoles of the Seminole general council meeting that allegedly 
took place in the fall of 1855, at which the only chief opposed to war, Chipco, was summarily 
banished from the tribe. But Brown goes on to recite the banana plant account as well, calling it 
the “spark that ignited an Indian war,” and claiming that “Both Seminole and army sources agree 
that Hartsuff’s troopers destroyed Bowlegs’ grove.” Of course, just because the soldiers 
destroyed the banana garden, does not necessarily mean that that is the direct reason for the 
Seminole attack. And, the “Seminole” source that Brown refers to is the DeVane brothers’ 
“book,” DeVane's Early Florida History. Furthermore, Brown includes a passage from Canova’s 
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book that most authors had not repeated for some time, even those who utilized the banana plant 
account. The passage refers to the alleged confrontation between Hartsuff and Bowlegs, with 
Brown going even further than Canova had, claiming that Hartsuff “kicked the chief to the 
ground and refused his demands,” the evening before the Seminole attack took place.58 In the 
conclusion to his chapter on the conflict, Brown takes a more general view and asserts that “The 
Third Seminole War erupted in December 1855 as a result of pressures designed to intimidate 
the Indians remaining in Florida to emigrate to the west.”59 How exactly the garden destruction 
and the physical confrontation fit into this much broader assessment is left for the reader to 
decide.  
 Prominent historian James J. Horgan decided to address the growing debate over 
Canova’s account directly in the text of his chapter on the 1850s found in Florida Decades: A 
Sesquicentennial History, 1845-1995 (1995). Horgan relates the typical interpretation but calls 
the story “apocryphal,” and flatly asserts that “The source of this anecdote is not credible,” while 
he cites Seley, Jr.’s article as his reference source for the refutation.60 Historians writing after 
1995 have been less committal than Horgan about denying the banana plant account altogether, 
but by the end of the twentieth century, a trend had finally begun that witnessed more and more 
historians at least willing to call into question the accuracy of Canova’s story.  
 One example of this new trend in the literature is Jay Jennings’ article “Fort Denaud: 
Logistics Hub of the Third Seminole War” that appeared in the Florida Historical Quarterly in 
2001. Jennings is a U.S. Army veteran himself, and his essay focuses primarily on the activities 
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of federal troops in South Florida in the years and months leading up to the war. The author 
details the patrols made by Hartsuff and his reconnaissance team and contends that “Whether the 
men vandalized Bowlegs’s garden or not is unclear, but they stole some of the Seminole’s prize 
bananas.” It seems that a more important question may be whether or not the evidence is clear 
that any of the soldiers’ actions directly caused the Seminole attack. Jennings goes on to note 
that “Later stories claimed that Hartsuff confronted Bowlegs and physically assaulted him, 
pushing him to the ground and kicking him. Perhaps this was an effort to spice up the tale, but 
the actual participants did not mention any contact with the Seminoles.”61 Jennings cites Seley, 
Jr.’s essay for his knowledge of the primary accounts of the “actual participants,” and does not 
seem to have consulted the original records himself.  
Another example of this trend is “South Florida’s Prelude to War: Army Correspondence 
Concerning Miami, Fort Dallas, and the Everglades Prior to the Outbreak of the Third Seminole 
War, 1850-1855” (2002), by Christopher Eck. The bulk of this article, which was published in 
Tequesta, is comprised of transcribed military letters.  These letters represent a valuable primary 
source considerately deciphered and reprinted by Eck, who also provides interludes of contextual 
information for his readers. Regarding the initial Seminole assault, Eck is inclined to accept the 
traditional account, though he acknowledges the debate: “Though there is disagreement over the 
significance of the arrival Hartsuff’s troops into Bowlegs’s settlement and whether it was the 
actual cause of the Third Seminole War, the presence of the soldiers – who apparently trampled 
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some of the crops and took some of Chief Bowlegs’ bananas from his garden – may well have 
incensed the Seminole leader for its disrespectful quality.”62  
 In a similar fashion to Christopher Eck’s conclusion, husband and wife historians John 
and Mary Lou Missall are also reluctant to completely abandon the banana plant interpretation. 
The Seminole Wars: America’s Longest Indian Conflict (2004) covers all three wars, but one 
reviewer points out that “Like all other books that claim to address the years through 1858, The 
Seminole Wars comes up short at the end: we still have no substitute for James Covington’s Billy 
Bowlegs’ War.”63 Another reviewer criticizes the authors’ simplistic descriptions and “lack of 
interpretive insight,” while also noting their failure to address the third conflict in much detail.64 
In their brief chapter on the third war, the Missalls chose somewhat odd phrasing to explain the 
attack on Hartsuff’s unit, stating that “According to legend, it was a rather trivial incident that 
sparked the explosion…Whether or not this incident really happened is open for debate; the 
primary account seems rather romanticized. One thing is for certain…a war party of about thirty 
Seminoles attacked.”65 While the authors cast some doubt on the account, they also link the 
alleged garden incident with the Seminole assault in their text, which still implies a cause-and-
effect relationship between the two to the reader.  
 Like the Missalls’ work, historian Joe Knetsch also addresses all three conflicts in 
Florida’s Seminole Wars, 1817-1858 (2003). Knetsch’s book contains a multitude of 
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illustrations, and combined with its complete lack of citations, it may seem easily dismissed by 
the scholarly community since it is clearly intended for a wider readership. But as one familiar 
with the available primary sources may attest, Knetsch rarely strays from the original evidence, 
and actually does not include any mention of Canova’s banana plant account whatsoever. The 
author summarizes the events in the years prior to the war in a clear and succinct manner without 
getting bogged down with many direct quotations. Knetsch emphasizes the “Indian Scare of 
1849 to 1850” and the subsequent political pressure from Florida’s governors and senators, who 
were in turn pressured by the state’s new white constituents, who demanded protection from the 
Indian threat while also preemptively amassing their own citizen militias. The author notes the 
army’s response of increased scouting and troop presence, before matter-of-factly concluding 
that the U.S. military’s “moves were well known to the Seminoles. The result was the December 
20, 1855, attack on the command of Lieutenant George Hartsuff near Billy Bowlegs’s town.”66 
Even in a book intended for the general public, Knetsch did not address the sensationalized 
banana plant account in any way, which remains a true rarity in the historiography.  
 Anthropologist Brent Weisman, in his book Unconquered People: Florida’s Seminole 
and Miccosukee Indians (2008), discusses the banana plant account briefly before seemingly 
dismissing it, concluding that “it is more likely that the chiefs had decided earlier that they must 
fight.” Weisman begins his following sentence with the phrase “In any case,” before relating the 
particulars of the Seminole attack, which ultimately leaves the interpretation up to his readers to 
determine how much stock they might put in the vandalism account.67 
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 While authors such as Horgan, Jennings, Knetsch, and Weisman have in recent years 
begun to cast doubt upon or altogether ignore Canova’s account, following the likes of 
Matthews, Tebeau, Covington, and Seley, Jr., before them, there are still many authors who 
continue to utilize the time-tested banana plant interpretation. More alarmingly, many of these 
sources are reference works or special interest books, and are much more likely to have an 
influence on the general public than the top-of-field scholarship. Even in a book titled Facts 
About the American Wars (1998), edited by John Bowman, which contains very brief synopses 
of each significant American conflict, the banana grove vandalism account is relied on almost 
exclusively under the sub-heading “Causes of the War.” The author notes that “The U.S. Army 
and the Florida militia were more than strong enough to take on the relatively powerless 
Seminole Indians,” which, like the banana account, seems more like a statement of interpretation 
rather than a “fact.”68 Similarly, Christopher Kimball’s brief reference book Timeline of Events 
and Battles of the Florida Seminole Wars (2001) also contains the familiar account. Kimball 
credits John and Mary Lou Missall with their editing assistance, and when the author conveys the 
garden account, he notes that “This story is not verified, but is generally believed to be true.”69 
Kimball seems to fall into the camp that is still on the fence about the standard interpretation; he 
is not quite willing to declare it as fact, nor is he willing to disregard it.  
 A History of Florida Forts: Florida’s Lonely Outposts (2006), by Alejandro de Quesada, 
contains vignettes of many of the forts manned during the three Seminole wars. In his chapter on 
Fort Myers, the author discusses the third war and includes the banana plant destruction account 
                                                 
68 John S. Bowman, ed., Facts About the American Wars (New York: H.W. Wilson Co, 1998), 174. 
69 Christopher D. Kimball, Timeline of Events and Battles of the Florida Seminole Wars (Goodland, FL: C.D. 
Kimball, 2001), 50. 
64 
 
to explain the outbreak. De Quesada lists Grismer’s The Story of Myers as his source, and 
includes the anecdote, rarely seen in the literature any more, that Hartsuff’s men “tripped Billy 
and sent him sprawling.”70 Despite the book’s intended audience as a special interest, or “coffee-
table” book, the inclusion of these anecdotes, as well as basic factual errors such as the statement 
that two of Hartsuff’s men were killed when actually four were, make the contribution yet 
another a disappointment that lacks meaningful historical interpretations.  
 Military historian Ron Field offered his take on the Indian conflicts in Florida with The 
Seminole Wars: 1818-1858 (2009). Field alters the standard interpretation slightly, but still 
utilizes Canova’s account as his primary source material. Field claims that Hartsuff’s troops 
destroyed Bowlegs’ banana plant garden in direct retaliation for the two burned American forts 
in the area. Furthermore, whereas most authors quote from Canova’s book the line that 
Hartsuff’s men wanted to “see how old Billy would cut up,” Field instead quotes Canova’s 
passage about Hartsuff’s Colt’s revolver, and how the Seminoles were “dismayed by the strange 
weapon.” Field’s book also contains the factual error that only two of the American soldiers were 
killed in the ambush, rather than the actual four.  
 Very similar to the previous four books discussed is Donald Spencer’s Florida at War: 
Forts and Battles (2011). Spencer is a computer historian  who dabbles in Florida history, and 
his coverage of the Third Seminole War in Florida at War constitutes less than one full page, 
with no discussion of the events leading up to the conflict or the broader factors at work. Spencer 
launches directly into the banana plant incident, and in this version, “The soldiers teased and 
laughed in his face; then they packed up and left Chief Bowlegs with his anger and destroyed 
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garden patch.”71 Spencer also erroneously claims that only two of the American soldiers were 
killed in the ambush, rather than the actual four, a continuing trend that indicates many of these 
authors are merely copying each other’s works rather than consulting the primary evidence 
themselves.  
 In 2011, amateur historian Edward Winn self-published …And the Blood Sank Into the 
Earth: The Story of the Three Seminole Wars. The author lists the works of John and Mary Lou 
Missall and Weisman in his brief bibliography, and similar to the conclusions put forth by those 
historians, Winn is noncommittal regarding his trust in the banana plant interpretation. He writes 
that “in December of 1855 a small detachment of U.S. soldiers came across one of Billy 
Bowleg’s villages and found it deserted. No one knows exactly what match actually started the 
fire, but about daylight, while the unsuspecting soldiers still slept, a war party of 30 Seminole 
warriors attacked the sleeping soldiers.”72 Of course, none of the soldiers were asleep at the time 
of the attack, but factual errors are nothing new to the literature regarding these events. The more 
noteworthy part of the passage is how the author vaguely alludes to the banana plant incident 
without actually ever mentioning it. Those familiar with the written history will undoubtedly 
understand the intended reference, but other readers are left to decipher a partial account. Winn 
follows the trend of neither confirming nor denying the validity of Canova’s account, and 
without explicitly discussing it, he only acknowledges that something may or may not have 
happened in Bowlegs’ deserted village prior to the assault. It should be noted, however, that 
Winn does take a wider view than most authors, and asserts that when considering the United 
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States’ history with Indian wars and Removal, the occurrence of the Third Seminole War 
“should not come as a total surprise.” He also contends that “The start the Third Seminole War 
was really in Washington,” and traces the political snow-ball effect back to the Swamp and 
Overflowed Land Act of 1850, which Winn considers as the beginning of the end for the 
remaining Florida Seminoles.73  
 Following in the tradition of historian and rights-activist Howard Zinn’s (in)famous book 
A People’s History of the United States (1980), is Adam Wasserman’s contribution, A People’s 
History of Florida, 1513-1876: How Africans, Seminoles, and Lower Class Whites Shaped the 
Sunshine State (2009). Like Zinn, Wasserman provides a sensationalized account of 
victimization and exploitation, and despite the tone and one-sided perspective, he does not 
contribute anything new to the debate regarding the outbreak of the third war. In Wasserman’s 
version, “For no reason other than to provoke a response, the survey burned down Bowlegs’ 
prized banana grove.” He then relates the alleged confrontation between the chief and Hartsuff, 
when the Lieutenant “kicked Bowlegs to the ground and arrogantly refused his demands.”74 
Wasserman cites as his source for this passage Covington’s article “An Episode in the Third 
Seminole War (1966). This is significant because Covington’s piece makes no mention of any 
damage done to Bowlegs’ garden, and certainly not to any confrontation between the two 
military leaders. Instead, Covington quotes one of the surviving American soldiers who stated 
that “some of the party took a bunch of bananas” from the abandoned village. Why the author 
would attribute the account regarding the garden destruction and subsequent confrontation to 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 74. 
74 Adam Wasserman, A People's History of Florida, 1513-1876: How Africans, Seminoles, Women, and Lower 
Class Whites Shaped the Sunshine State (Sarasota, FL: A. Wasserman, 2009), 302. 
67 
 
Covington is up to speculation, but it seems to represent another example of irresponsible 
scholarship, at the least. 
  Ethnohistorian Andrew Frank, author of Creeks and Southerners: Biculturalism on the 
Early American Frontier (2005), is “currently finishing a book-length manuscript on the history 
of the Florida Seminoles tentatively entitled Those Who Camp at a Distance: The Seminoles and 
Indians of Florida,” according to his website. Frank has already penned a book on the subject, 
simply titled The Seminole (2011), but its primary intended audience is a juvenile readership. 
Frank was the book reviewer who criticized the Missalls’ treatment of the third war in their book 
The Seminole Wars, when Frank asserted that the conflict remained “overlooked.” And although 
his book is intentionally simplified for a younger audience, his explanation of the opening of the 
Third Seminole War makes a dangerous leap of speculation. Frank claims that the act of 
Hartsuff’s men cutting down Bowlegs’ banana trees, “which was intentionally designed to get 
Bowlegs to initiate an attack on American soldiers, worked as planned.”75 In addition to the 
logical assumption that the four soldiers who lost their lives, and the four others who were 
severely wounded, probably would have rather not been shot to pieces by Seminole rifles, 
Frank’s claim has no evidential support whatsoever. That Frank’s interpretation is found in a 
juvenile reference book on Seminole history and culture, published in 2011, highlights the 
continued entrenchment of the banana plant story, and its ability to be twisted and further 
convoluted by authors who fail to research the subject in depth themselves.  
There have been many articles and books written over the years that address topics 
parallel to and on the periphery of the Third Seminole War, as well as others that discuss the 
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conflict but omit mention of the attack on Hartsuff’s unit. One recent contribution in particular 
deserves mention here for its notable omissions. America's Hundred Years' War: U.S. Expansion 
to the Gulf Coast and the Fate of the Seminole, 1763-1858 (2011), edited by Stephen Belko, 
contains nine different essays on various aspects associated with all three Seminole wars.76 The 
book’s central thesis is that the Seminole Wars should not be viewed as separate, distinct 
conflicts, but rather as one continuous struggle. Several of the essays address the early origins of 
conflict in Florida, dating back well into the eighteenth century, and despite the implication made 
by the very title of the book, there is no coverage whatsoever of the conflict from 1855-1858, nor 
any discussion of the years leading up to that final war. The only mention of the third war, in the 
book’s introduction, notes how little has been written on the subject, and a footnote points 
readers to Covington’s The Billy Bowlegs War as the lone suggestion for further reading.  
     
Conclusion  
 This chapter’s analysis of virtually every work written on this subject may seem like a 
tedious exercise, but it is important to trace each book and essay in order to uncover the reasons 
for the persistent deficiencies in the historiography of the Third Seminole War. As noted in 
Chapter 1, social factors and popular attitudes were undoubtedly a major influence on the first 
wave of literature, but authors who published works in the mid to late twentieth century were 
plagued by other problems as well. For one, relatively few of the writers on the subject were 
professionally-trained historians, and many quite clearly failed to conduct their own primary 
                                                 
76 Other examples of Seminole histories that fail to address the Third Seminole War are Grant Foreman’s Indian 
Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1932), 
and The Five Civilized Tribes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), and Edwin McReynolds’ The 
Seminoles (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957).  
69 
 
source analysis, which led to a dependency on secondary literature, and presumably made writers 
reluctant to challenge the banana plant account. The continued prevalence of factual errors is an 
additional by-product of the reliance on secondary sources. Another reason for the perpetuation 
of the banana plant story is that many written works which include Canova’s account are not 
directly focused on the opening of the war, but rather on peripheral or over-lapping topics. Local 
histories, histories of wars and forts, books on Seminole culture, and books on the draining of the 
Everglades or the taming of the Florida frontier, are some examples of the types of works that 
include the banana plant interpretation, without direct analysis of the episode. 
 The failure of prominent historians to address the banana plant account in depth, or at all, 
is another reason for its continued use. The collection of essays edited by Stephen Belko, 
America's Hundred Years' War (2011), contain no analysis of the Third Seminole War 
whatsoever. And the few historians who have attempted to provide full histories of all three wars 
invariably left the third conflict under-evaluated, such as Virginia Peters’ The Florida Wars 
(1979), and John and Mary Lou Missall’s The Seminole Wars (2004). And, although Covington 
never quoted Canova’s work directly, his reluctance to challenge the account or to provide his 
own clear interpretation is a disappointment, especially since he always pointed his audience to 
Seley, Jr.’s refutation article for further analysis.  
 While a handful of historians have challenged or altogether ignored the banana plant 
story, many more have continued to rely on the account as the official record of the events. 
Troublingly, many of the more recent publications are reference works or special interest books, 
and are more likely to have an influence on the general public and school children than the top-
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of-field scholarship. There appears to be a period of lag, and a trickle-down effect that occurs 
between the publication of top scholarship in a field, and its dissemination to more general 
audiences. This is certainly the case for the literature on the Third Seminole War, and since the 
amount of works that rely on the banana plant account still far out-number those that do not, it 
may be some time yet before the trend can be reversed. But fuller interpretations will only be 
possible if historians can relinquish their dependence on the secondary literature in order to 
provide more balanced and nuanced explanations.   
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CHAPTER 3: OTHER POSSIBLE CATALYSTS: REASSESSING U.S. 
PERSPECTIVES 
 This chapter examines the specific events leading up to and occurring during the Third 
Seminole War and incorporates primary source analysis and suggestions for further research. 
This analysis is divided up into three main sections, consisting of the pre-war years (1843-1854), 
which includes a summary of the various events and measures passed as part of the U.S. 
government’s attempts to coerce the remaining Seminoles out of Florida. The second portion is 
centered on the events just before and after the actual outbreak of fighting. The official 
statements provided by the American soldiers who survived the attack on Hartsuff’s 
reconnaissance team are analyzed here and are especially useful in gaining insight into the days 
and hours just before the Seminole assault, at least from their perspectives. In addition, the third 
section of this chapter highlights the varied perspectives found in contemporary newspaper 
accounts, soldiers’ memoirs, and other sources that illustrate the attitudes of Florida’s white 
population.   
  
Primary Source Overview 
 Documents from the United States government constitute the majority of primary source 
material relating to the outbreak of the Third Seminole War. Senate reports, the Florida 
Governors’ administrative letters, state laws and resolutions passed, and the military 
correspondences of the troops on the ground in South Florida, which contain the details 
concerning the reconnaissance conducted by Hartsuff and the eyewitness reports of those 
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soldiers who survived the Seminole assault. Although the Florida Seminoles did not leave behind 
any written documents of their own, their words can sometimes be found in the annual reports of 
the Office of Indian Affairs, in the Seminole agency letters, and in Seminole agent John Casey’s 
diary, but these instances are few, and often quite general in message.   
 Newspapers and periodicals covered the events as they unfolded in Florida in the 1850s 
and remain a useful source, albeit one with limitations due to the speculative and sensational 
nature of journalism. A small number of settler and traveler accounts also exist. There are a 
number of memoirs and autobiographies written by U.S. soldiers, but most were published many 
years after the conflict, which makes it difficult to determine just how accurately they reflect the 
events as they took place in the 1850s. Andrew Canova’s book is part of this group of writings, 
but his was the first to offer a significantly different version of the events than had been 
previously known. How exactly these types of sources should be evaluated is a central problem 
that faces scholars who study this topic. Adding to the uncertainty of the soldiers’ accounts 
penned decades after the war are the continued writings into the mid-twentieth century that claim 
to speak for eyewitnesses to the conflict, with some offering wild variations of Canova’s banana 
garden story.  
 
1842 – 1854: The Pressure Builds 
 Creating an Old South (2002) by Edward Baptist, analyzes the migration and settlement 
patterns of two north Florida counties in a prominent plantation area, from the opening of the 
Territory in 1821 up until the eve of the Civil War. While Baptist’s study is limited in its 
coverage of the Seminole Wars, it provides insight into the cultural world of the “planter-
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politicians,” who dominated the financial interests and the political decision-making, and the 
lower-class white settlers, who struggled for masculine independence and honor against the elite 
slave-owning office-holders. Two aspects of life on the Florida frontier that both classes of white 
pioneers agreed on, however, were their fondness of chattel slavery, and their hatred of 
American Indians. And, while land speculation, public office, and the extension of slavery were 
essential goals of many of Florida’s newcomers, the continued existence of a Native population, 
especially the fearsome and feared Seminoles, was never going be deemed acceptable to elite 
decision-makers who held sway over Florida politics. Baptist claims that since the planter class 
could not apply their usual weapons of physical intimidation, social humiliation, or political 
domination on the Seminoles, they were therefore beyond the control of white Southern society. 
And since Indians could not be controlled by the typical means, the white settlers of Florida 
insisted that the only appropriate action was the complete removal of all Indians from the entire 
state.1 Underscoring their concerns about the Seminole population was the potential for runaway 
slaves to ally with the neighboring Indian tribes, a consequence that produced bloody and 
memorable results during the Second Seminole War.  
 At the close of the Second Seminole War in 1842, roughly four-hundred Indians 
remained in South Florida, including Seminoles, Miccosukees, Yuchis, Tallahassees, Creeks, and 
Choctaws.2 Despite their varied tribal and linguistic differences, most people in the United States 
collectively referred to them by the name Seminoles. On August 14, 1842, General William 
Worth concluded an agreement that allocated a two and one-half million acre plot of land to be 
                                                 
1 Edward E. Baptist, Creating an Old South: Middle Florida’s Plantation Frontier before the Civil War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 156-157. 
2 Covington, The Seminoles of Florida, 113.  
74 
 
used temporarily by these Indians until their peaceable removal from the territory could be 
affected.3 While the Seminoles may have considered the reservation to be their permanent home, 
the precedent set by Congress’s passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the designation of 
Florida as a U.S. state in 1845, and the lingering animosity on all sides due to the past Seminole 
wars, meant that the Florida Indians would repeatedly face challenges for control of the lands 
they lived on. Historian Stephen Rockwell claims that although the implementation of the Indian 
Removal Act is often viewed as a chaotic mess, the process was usually, eventually anyway, 
successful. It was ad hoc, inconsistent, piece-meal, certainly inhumane, but effective.4 And even 
though the military might of the United States turned its attention toward Mexico following the 
haphazard “conclusion” of the Second Seminole War in Florida, there were many in white 
society, public office-holders and citizens alike, who never lost sight of the goal to remove every 
last Indian from Florida.  
In 1844, Worth discovered just how temporary his arrangement was intended to be. The 
new Secretary of War, William Wilkins, sent a dispatch to Worth explaining that despite the 
current “pacific disposition” of the Florida Seminoles, President John Tyler insisted that “policy 
requires their removal.”5 Worth was ordered to immediately make arrangements to negotiate 
removal with the remaining Seminoles, but to avoid military force, resorting alone to the “arts of 
persuasion.” However, Worth was not able to deliver this message of assurance, as the various 
Indian bands in Florida uniformly agreed not to engage in any negotiations with government 
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officials during this period. The Seminoles expected that if they abided by the terms of Worth’s 
agreement, they should be able to remain in the state. 
In an effort to entice settlers to Florida despite the continued existence of several hundred 
Indians, and the fresh memory of the bitter Second Seminole War, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Armed Occupation Act of 1842. The act provided free acreage in Florida for any non-Native 
settlers willing to take up residence in Florida, improve the land, and defend themselves against 
the Seminole threat. Florida Governor Thomas Brown was one of several who expressed doubts 
over the effectiveness of the act, and historians Knetsch and Paul George point out the act’s 
many logistical problems, including its failure to “contribute a fighting force to expel the 
Seminoles from Florida,” in their essay “A Problematical Law: The Armed Occupation Act of 
1842 and Its Impact on Southeast Florida” (1993).6 Conversely, historian Covington insists that 
the pioneers who accepted lands in the extreme southern portion of the state “constantly 
complained about the Seminole Indian threat in Florida and finally forced a showdown by 
reluctant federal officials…Thus the Armed Occupation Act indirectly resulted in the removal 
from Florida of most of the Seminole Indians.”7  
 Despite the demands for immediate removal by Secretary of War Wilkins and President 
Tyler in 1844, on May 19, 1845 incoming President James Polk designated a twenty-mile wide 
buffer zone surrounding the temporary Indian reserve in response to complaints of boundary 
disputes on both sides. In addition to Seminole hunters roaming beyond the boundary lines in 
search of game, and white settlers squatting illegally on the Indian reserve, another primary point 
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of contention was cattle. The Florida cattlemen did not keep their stock on ranches, but rather let 
the cattle graze freely all over the state. Cattle had always been an integral part of Seminole 
society as well (Billy Bowlegs was a descendent of the “Cowkeeper Dynasty”), and Indians did 
not hesitate to kill any stray cows that roamed near their reserve.8  
 Captain John Sprague, who was in charge of Indian Affairs in Florida, and was the first to 
publish a full account of the Second Seminole War, was able to meet with several Seminole 
leaders at Charlotte Harbor in January of 1847. Although the Indians were cautious and reluctant 
to meet with him, Sprague reported that they “have adopted vigorous laws to punish those who 
violate the relation existing between the whites and red men but the young men…are ruthless, 
vicious and vengeful.”9 Sprague’s observations indicate that while the Seminole chiefs had hopes 
of abiding strictly by the terms of Worth’s agreement, some of the younger warriors were 
difficult to control, or at least that is what they wanted the Americans to believe. Over the 
following two years, the Seminole chiefs refused to meet with any American official. Despite the 
personal friendship between Bowlegs and Indian Agent Casey, the chief sent word to the Indian 
agent that he and his people feared for him being “seized” involuntarily and sent west against his 
will.10   
In response to repeated complaints by white citizens that Indians were crossing over the 
designated boundary to raid farms and steal livestock, Florida Governor William Mosely wrote 
to President Polk, urging him to remove the Seminoles, by force, if necessary. Rather than wait 
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for national intervention, the Florida General Assembly passed a law in early 1849 that declared 
it illegal for the supervising Indian agent in Florida to allow the Seminoles to leave their reserve 
for any reason and banned the sale of alcohol to them. On July 12, 1849, a small band of 
Seminoles, later branded as “outsiders,” or outlaws, by the tribe’s leaders, killed one white man, 
wounded another, and vandalized a settlement on the east coast of South Florida, north of Fort 
Pierce. Five days later, the same Seminole band made their way across the peninsula, killed two 
more white settlers and burned down a trading post on the Peace River. No one knows exactly 
what motivated the killings, but Colonel C. F. Smith did not consider the actions to be indicative 
of war aims, “but rather as an act of retaliation for some injury fancied or real.”11 Covington 
speculates that the killers may have been angry about the recently passed measures designed to 
confine them to their reserve. Or they may have been exacting revenge on unscrupulous white 
traders, as Smith alluded to, considering the man killed on the east coast was a former Indian 
trader, and the post burned down on the west coast was run by Thomas Kennedy and John 
Darling, two men who were invested in the economic development of South Florida and who 
pushed especially hard for Seminole removal.12 The Seminole murders were disavowed by the 
tribe’s leaders and contact was made between Bowlegs and Casey with an agreement being 
reached for the Indians to turn over the culprits once they could be located and captured. 
Regarding the proposition of removal, Casey reported that it may be possible “within a few 
years,” but “The prospect of removing them peaceably is not, at present, favorable. It is believed 
                                                 
11 Smith to Marshall, July 17, 1849, Relative to Hostilities, 26-27. 
12 James Covington, “Billy Bowlegs, Sam Jones, and the Crisis of 1849,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 68, no. 3 
(January 1990): 303. See also, Joe Knetsch, “Florida’s Seminole Wars In and Around Manatee County,” Manatee 
County Historical Society Meeting. Bradenton, Florida, May 15, 2013. 
http://www.manateecountyhistoricalsociety.com/2013-knetsch-on-the-third-seminole-war/ (accessed November 25, 
2014).   
78 
 
that their laws still outlaw any chief who shall propose to negotiate on the subject.”13 On October 
18, 1849, Bowlegs, Sam Jones, and other Seminole leaders turned over the surviving Indian 
murderers to General David Twiggs in the presence of the tribe’s young warriors. Andrew Frank 
contends that “This public act had a message for both the U.S. and Seminole dissenters: Bowlegs 
intended to adhere to the terms of the 1842 truce and he expected others to do the same.”14 Frank 
considers this episode a “success of traditional diplomacy,” and while it may be true that peace 
was temporarily attained, the federal government, local policy-makers, as well as Florida’s white 
citizens, now had a violent episode to point to as proof of the Seminoles’ inability to coexist with 
whites, and calls for their complete removal would grow ever louder after these murders.  
 Despite the Seminoles’ cooperation in punishing the guilty members of their tribe, and 
their insistence that removal negotiations were out of the question, immediate preparations for 
their removal from Florida were made by the federal government following the 1849 killings. 
Secretary of War George Crawford and Secretary of the Interior Thomas Ewing instructed the 
military commander and the Indian agent in charge in Florida that the Seminoles’ “speedy 
removal to the West appears desirable and necessary. The administration being thus impressed, 
have concluded that their removal, voluntary or forcible, is to be effected.” They insist, though, 
that “The essence of this proposition is in its application to their voluntarily emigrating,” before 
they ultimately authorized the use of force “should it become necessary…to effect the object.”15 
Enticement funds totaling $215, 000 were allocated, and a delegation of Western Seminoles 
(from Indian Territory) was assembled to travel to Florida in an attempt to persuade their 
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relatives to negotiate for removal. Twiggs took the lead in the negotiations, offering financial 
inducements, five hundred dollars for each warrior and one hundred dollars for any woman or 
child, and was successful to a degree as 74 Indians agreed to emigrate west. Both Casey and 
Twiggs expressed the belief that full removal was imminently likely, but when Bowlegs and the 
other chiefs presented themselves for the meeting in a show of good faith, they informed the 
Americans that the majority of the tribe would not consider leaving Florida.16 By May 1850, 
Twiggs and Casey gave up and cut off the negotiations. Casey noted that “Although the hope of 
removing the Seminoles in a body has gone, there is still some reason to expect gradual and 
peaceful emigration.”17 This statement highlights two key points: a desire to leave Florida was 
present in some portion of the tribe, but was likely suppressed by the influential chiefs for some 
reason, and the Indian Affairs Office was not going to cease their attempts, and were content to 
remove small groups at different times if that was what it took to fulfill the goal.  
 Although Twiggs and the Western delegation had difficulty getting the Florida Seminoles 
to discuss removal, Secretary of War Crawford remained convinced that “The peaceful removal 
of those Indians is, and until accomplished, must continue to be, the first object of the 
Executive.”18 The Western Seminoles were sent home with instructions to immediately prepare a 
new delegation, comprised of more prominent leaders such as Coacoochee (Wildcat) and Jim 
Jumper, for a return trip to Florida. While the state militia was quickly demobilized, the number 
of federal troops in Florida increased, but many in the state wanted the white citizens themselves 
to solve the Seminole problem, including one newspaper editorialist who would have rather had 
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the Indians hunted down dead for reward money than to see them “set free in the west.”19 In 
1850, Congress passed the Swamp and Overflowed Land Act, which transferred title of federally 
owned wetlands to the states for immediate sale with the agreement that the lands would be 
drained and used to promote economic development. A corollary to economic stimulation was 
the desire to impress upon the Florida Seminoles that in a few short years “they will be entirely 
surrounded by the whites.”20   
 The next incident to occur that undermined the Florida Seminoles’ efforts to remain in 
the state unmolested involved the murder of a young white boy in Marion County in August 
1850. The Seminole killers were captured by members of their own tribe and turned over to 
Casey and U.S. authorities, although the alleged perpetrators claimed to be innocent and guilty 
only of falling out of favor with the chiefs.21 In the meantime, the supervision of Indian tribes 
was transferred from the War Department to the Interior Department and a new approach to the 
removal efforts was initiated. In addition to the employment of a second delegation of Western 
Seminoles, a private contractor, Indian “special agent” Luther Blake, was hired to effect the 
removal of the Florida Seminoles. Blake spared no expense (of federal funds), offered liberal 
terms to Bowlegs and others, even took several chiefs on a sight-seeing tour of New York City 
and Washington D.C. in the fall of 1852, and ultimately did not convince a single Seminole to 
leave Florida voluntarily. By June 1853, Casey was reappointed as the Indian agent in Florida, 
replacing Blake.  
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 In his 1853 inaugural address, Florida Governor James Broome announced that the 
presence of the Seminoles is a “blight on our prosperity,” and the state “will never submit to a 
policy which looks to anything short of their removal.”22 And while President Millard Fillmore 
agreed with the notion, he insisted that more money was needed in order to properly survey the 
land. But Secretary of the Interior Alexander Stuart recognized that “surveying of the country 
would cause hostilities,” and suggested that Congress be consulted in such affairs. Covington 
speculates that Fillmore, Stuart, and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea, were “reluctant 
to plan a shooting war” when their terms in office were soon to expire.23 Nevertheless, the state 
of Florida continued to pass measures designed to aggravate the Indian population. One 
stipulation prohibited the Seminoles from all trading with fishing vessels on the coasts, and a law 
passed in 1849 made it illegal for any Indian to roam beyond the boundaries of the designated 
reserve, while another portion of the same law banned the sale of liquor to the Indians.24    
 While the Office of Indian Affairs remained subject to the Department of the Interior, 
supervision of the Florida Seminoles was transferred back to the War Department by President 
Franklin Pierce in 1853. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis took over the ultimate responsibility 
for removal of Indians and declared the past policies as complete failures. While Davis was 
deciding on the elements of his new policy, yet another delegation of Seminoles from Indian 
Territory journeyed to Florida to confer with Bowlegs. The Seminole chiefs were again taken on 
a trip to New York and Washington, and again stoutly refused to consider removal. In August 
1854, Davis initiated a plan that included the survey and sale of land in South Florida, including 
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the lands immediately bordering the Indian reserve, and an increased military presence to 
conduct the surveys, make roads, and build forts to protect the settler population and “so as more 
securely to confine the Seminoles within the Everglades region.”25  
 The events discussed over the previous several pages are well-known and are covered in 
detail in government documents available at the National Archives, many of which are now 
accessible online, and also in the papers of Casey found at the University of Florida’s archives. 
The purpose of summarizing them here is to highlight the domino effect that saw the pressure on 
the Florida Seminoles increase exponentially, especially with the killings of 1849, and again with 
the adoption of Secretary Davis’ plan. These events that preceded the Third Seminole War have 
been analyzed by many historians, dating back to Coe’s Red Patriots, but some authors ignore 
the build-up of incidents, or at least underestimate their effects on the motivations of the 
Seminoles. By focusing almost exclusively on the attack on Hartsuff’s unit and the banana plant 
account, some writers have dismissed valuable context that helps to explain the situation more 
fully from all sides, especially the impact of the conditions out west in Indian Territory. The 
following section focuses on the movements and actions of the federal soldiers charged with 
patrolling the swamps of South Florida, based on an assessment of the primary documentary 
evidence.  
 
U.S. Army Patrols 1854 – 1855: A Breach of Understanding 
 In the fall of 1854, federal soldiers were tasked with conducting reconnaissance and 
making maps in order to construct roads and outposts for the purpose of connecting a line of 
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forts from the east coast of Florida to the west coast. In January 1855, Lieutenant George L. 
Hartsuff was appointed as the Army’s topographical engineer in charge of the survey operations 
in the Everglades area south and west of Lake Okeechobee. New forts and blockhouses were 
constructed while old ones were reactivated during the following months of heavy activity. 
Hartsuff selected the sites for two of the new forts, named Fort Simon Drum and Fort 
Shackelford. Despite the military presence so near to the villages of Bowlegs and Sam Jones, 
Lieutenant John Greble noted that the Seminoles often engaged in amiable interaction with the 
troops in the area, and even Bowlegs himself would visit the camps and “was always very 
friendly.” But Greble also acknowledged that he and his fellow brothers-at-arms lived under the 
“continual apprehension of an attack,” and that perhaps “the red men only waited for a good 
opportunity to show themselves the most implacable foes.”26 Indian agent Casey reported that 
some Seminole leaders had complained to him that the frequency of troop movements in the area 
made hostilities likely, and he requested that the military commander in Florida, Colonel John 
Munroe, inform his troops that and Seminoles found within the designated Indian boundary were 
“not to be questioned or molested.” Casey also contended that a stricter enforcement of the no-
trade policy may have an impact on the Seminoles’ decision to continue resisting removal.27  
The newly constructed blockhouses and Forts Drum and Shackelford were temporarily 
abandoned when the military activity in the swamplands came to a pause in June 1855 because 
of the extreme rainfall brought on by the region’s wet season. Another overlooked aspect of the 
origins of the Third Seminole War is the impact of the wet and dry seasons in South Florida. 
                                                 
26 Benson J. Lossing, Memoir of Lieut.-Col. John T. Greble, of the United States Army (Philadelphia, PA: Printed for 
Private Circulation, 1870), 36, https://archive.org/details/lieutcoljohntgre00loss (accessed November 24, 2014). 
27 Casey to Munroe, October 28, 1854, and December 13, 1854, Letters Sent, Troops in Florida. 
84 
 
Major road and fort construction, as well as accurate reconnaissance mapping, were only 
possible during the dry season, roughly from December through May. From June until 
November, the water levels were so high that most of the trails and roads were unavailable for 
heavy activity that required wagons and draft animals. During the dry season of 1854-1855, the 
Seminoles watched with interest and curiosity from their nearby villages, but remained 
“friendly,” as the massive amount of federal troops set about their work. But the following 
winter season, Hartsuff and the first patrol team of the season would find the situation altered 
significantly.      
Hartsuff and a team of ten other men set out from Fort Myers on December 7, 1855 with 
orders from Colonel Harvey Brown to return to Forts Drum and Shackelford “and those parts of 
the Big Cypress Swamp explored last year,” in order to “examine their present condition; 
whether the forts are in good order and have not been disturbed.” In addition, the unit was to 
report on the “cultivation and provisions of the Indians and more particularly,” whether the 
nearby villages were “inhabited now or at any time during the winter by them.”28 The answer to 
Brown’s first inquiry was that the new forts had been more than just disturbed; they had been 
burned down completely. And secondly, Hartsuff concluded that no Indians had been living in 
the area for some time, and all of the nearby villages were now deserted and overgrown. After 
exploring the area for close to two weeks, Hartsuff received orders to return to Fort Myers. On 
the morning of December 20, 1855, as some of the men ate breakfast and others prepared the 
wagons for departure, a Seminole war party opened fire on the camp of American troops, killing 
four men and wounding four others.      
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Five out of the six surviving soldiers, besides Hartsuff, gave official reports of the 
Seminole assault that were sent to headquarters at Fort Brooke, near Tampa. It cannot be known 
whether the men conversed with each other in some form of corroboration to conceal their 
activities while out on their scouting, as Canova’s account might suggest. But it should be noted 
that all five of the reports are almost identical regarding the team’s movements in the days prior 
to the ambush, and the five men returned on foot to Fort Myers separately, in three different 
groups, with three of the men seriously wounded. The reports were collected from the men and 
mailed to headquarters on December 26, 1855. When the statements of the soldiers are 
evaluated, and if they are to be trusted, it seems apparent that the Seminole attack on their unit 
took them completely by surprise. Throughout their reconnaissance of the several Indian villages 
in the vicinity between Fort Myers and Big Cypress Swamp, the group encountered no signs of 
any Indians living in the area, as Sergeant Holland noted, “the old trails were all overgrown.”29 
They did come across two Indians, a man and a boy, who were driving hogs, but the pair 
declined to offer the soldiers any information.30 The party then discovered that Forts Drum and 
Shackelford had been burned down, along with their blockhouses, and Private Baker noticed, 
“that all mile posts and signboards were taken down.”31  
The one piece of evidence that does support Canova’s claim also comes from Baker, who 
noted that while four of the men were patrolling “Billy’s Camp,” “some of the party took a 
bunch of bananas.”32 This admission seems to corroborate Canova’s interpretation, considering 
that if the soldiers were guilty of any serious wrongdoing, they would have been very unlikely to 
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include it in their official statements. But the statements provided by these men suggest that they 
were utterly convinced that no one had been living anywhere in the area for a significant amount 
of time, and therefore no one would have been around to supervise Bowlegs’ garden. The fact 
that Hartsuff’s men did take some bananas from Bowlegs’ garden is not in question, but rather 
the intentions of the troops and the supposed reaction of the Seminoles has been misinterpreted 
due to Canova’s emphasis on personal offense. Holland asserted in his report that, “Mr. Hartsuff 
told me that he thought there were no Indians in the country, that he could find no signs of them, 
and that he thought they had gone to the sea coast and had taken with them all the troops they 
had last winter – the only Indians, or signs of them, that we saw, until attacked, was the two 
driving hogs.”33 This sentiment was echoed by Corporal Williams, who related that, “the Lieut. 
(Hartsuff) said he did not think any Indians had been in country to live since last year”34 If the 
soldiers truly believed that no Indians had been living in the villages for some time, most likely 
since the previous dry season, then the troops were probably only guilty of food foraging, and 
not the malicious intent of inciting a war that is so often attributed to their actions. Regardless, 
the more significant historical inquiry is whether the soldiers’ actions directly caused the 
Seminoles to attack, which, considering the available evidence, seems incredibly unlikely.   
The soldiers in Hartsuff’s unit had good reason to trust his conclusions regarding the 
Seminoles’ whereabouts, evidence of their movements, and the feasibility of engaging them 
militarily. Hartsuff was well familiar with the region and in a report from the previous dry 
season, he offered some opinions regarding the Seminole situation.  He considered their 
strongholds “impregnable,” and that they “might baffle the search of our whole army” if forcible 
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expulsion were attempted. He also noted their stockpile of “powder and ball” and the utter failure 
of past expeditions to locate hidden Seminole villages in the swamps of South Florida.35 In the 
official report of the Seminole assault on Hartsuff’s unit, Colonel Harvey Brown also displayed 
confidence in the summations of Hartsuff, explaining to his superiors that “he (Hartsuff), having 
during the last winter repeatedly passed unmolested alone, and with an escort of one man, over 
the very same grounds; and the Indians never subsequently having given the slightest evidence of 
a hostile disposition.” Brown repeatedly pointed out in his report that “not the slightest evidence” 
existed that suggested any Indians were in the area, since Hartsuff had informed him that “the 
paths that were fresh and traveled last winter, are now quite overgrown”36   
Estimates of the number of Seminoles who participated in the attack range from twenty-
five to forty, according to the varying reports of the survivors. In attempting to discern whether 
the Seminole attack was predetermined by the various Indian bands, or whether the war decision 
was made only after the banana theft incident, some evidence from the soldiers’ reports is 
illuminating. Baker observed that the Indians, “were handsomely dressed in red dresses and I 
think they were painted.”37 Holland noticed that “there were thirty five or forty Indians – they 
had black plumes and white ones.”38 Although it is conceivably possible that the Seminole war 
party made their decision to attack Hartsuff’s company only after the garden incident, their 
sizable force and elaborate dress and war paint is another indication that a significant amount of 
planning was undertaken prior to the decision to attack. Furthermore, the burning of the forts and 
blockhouses and the removal of signage should have been a clear indication of the Seminoles’ 
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desire for U.S. troops to refrain from entering their territory all together, and that the overall 
situation had changed drastically since the previous season. Little else can be learned about the 
soldiers under Hartsuff’s command from the available records except that Private John Hanna 
was promoted to Corporal shortly after the Seminole attack. The reason for his promotion was 
likely due to his decisive defensive actions during the ambush and the attrition caused by the loss 
of life within the unit. This may be thin evidence to base any presumptions on, but logic would 
indicate that any soldier partly responsible for inciting a war would not have been promoted.  
Seley, Jr. posits that the two Indians driving hogs may have communicated the movement 
of the U.S. troops to the Seminole warriors, who then made their decision to plan an assault at 
the most opportune time. Seley, Jr. denies that Seminoles were even aware of the U.S. soldiers’ 
activities in the abandoned villages since their likely route from the new villages to the scene of 
the ambush would not have taken them near Bowlegs’ abandoned garden, which the group did 
not visit until two days prior to the attack.39 But the possibility should not be dismissed so easily 
that Seminoles may have known all of the soldiers’ movements, especially since Hartsuff had 
previously noted “their perfect system of espionage and signal fires.”40 He was referring 
specifically to the possibility of taking the enemy unaware, but the message was clear that the 
Seminoles had an effective system for maintaining surveillance over what they still considered to 
be their territory. Even if the Seminoles were aware of whatever may have occurred in Bowlegs’ 
village, it still would not necessarily mean that the attack was prompted solely for instant 
retaliation and not some larger purpose. Seley, Jr. hypothesizes that “the attack was likely 
prompted by the exuberance” of one young warrior and his cohorts, who wanted “to do 
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something that would impress their own people.”41 While Seley, Jr.’s essay represents one of the 
best detailed studies of the movements of Hartsuff’s team, if not the only one, his explanation for 
the reason behind the attack fails to consider the broader context. Seley, Jr. made a point to 
analyze in depth the records of the troops stationed in Florida, and in doing so, failed to consult 
all but a few other sources. He may not have reached the same conclusion if he had considered 
that in the recent past, after the killings of 1849 and 1850, Seminole warriors who committed 
violent acts without the sanction of the chiefs were disavowed and branded as outlaws. The 
collective Seminole response to the ambush on Hartsuff’s men was not to claim ignorance and 
seek a path to peace, as they had done in the past, but rather to continue with coordinated assaults 
on outposts and individuals all across South Florida.  
While examination of the surviving U.S. soldiers’ reports alone does not provide the 
context needed to fully understand the factors that led to bloodshed, it does provide insight into 
the perspectives of the American soldiers so often blamed for inciting the war. Analyses of the 
soldiers’ statements, their precise movements in the days leading up to the attack, including their 
discovery of the burned forts and abandoned villages, and the later revelation of an Indian 
council gathering, all seem to indicate that the Seminole attack was predetermined to some 
degree, and not the result of a personal insult stemming from agricultural destruction. Since 
Hartsuff was the army’s topographical engineer, and had been responsible for furnishing the 
most detailed map to date of the Seminoles’ primary villages, in addition to overseeing the 
construction of the two new forts that were subsequently burned down, it was probably not a 
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coincidence that his unit was the one chosen for the assault, as Covington has pointed out.42 
Perhaps Lieutenant Greble was correct when he suggested, albeit with hindsight, that the 
Seminoles’ friendly disposition during the previous season of activity was merely a façade 
intended to mask their preparations for war.  
 
Further Perspectives: Newspapers, Soldiers’ Memoirs, and Florida’s White Settlers 
Contemporary newspapers represent another perspective from which to consider the 
Seminole attack on the American soldiers, and many can now be found online in the Florida 
Digital Newspaper Library. It was no secret that the majority of white Floridians wanted the 
remaining Indians in the state removed by any means necessary although occasionally the 
opposite view was expressed. One settler wrote to the Jacksonville Florida News and pointed out 
that in his opinion, only the cattle barons on the South Florida frontier stood to benefit from the 
Indians’ departure.43 Florida’s white citizens sometimes disagreed on whether either federal 
troops or the volunteer militia should have the primary responsibility of removing the 
Seminoles.44 Just five days before the assault on Hartsuff’s troops, a writer for the Tampa 
Herald, having considered the accumulation of soldiers and the military activity taking place, 
wrote that “We expect by every mail from Fort Myers to hear of commencement of active 
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operations.”45 Once the hostilities had actually commenced, most newspapers reported the 
assault in a matter-of-fact manner, with the Tallahassee Floridian and Journal running the 
headline “Another Indian War Commenced,” while the Tampa Peninsular’s headline stated “Ten 
Soldiers Fired Upon by the Indians.”46 An official military report was sent from the army’s 
headquarters in Florida to the local newspapers that simply stated that the soldiers of an 
“exploring party…were suddenly attacked by a party of Seminole Indians”47 The Tallahassee 
Floridian and Journal concluded that “The unprovoked attack upon Lt. Hartsuff’s 
command…assures us beyond doubt, of the determined hostile purposes of the tribe,” while the 
Tampa Peninsular called for the “speedy eradication of…the incubus which has ruled the destiny 
of our State.”48 
Many white Floridians did not seem surprised or daunted by the commencement of 
another Indian War, and even Secretary of War Crawford had previously expressed his belief 
that there existed “what appeared to be a prominent wish of a portion of the inhabitants of 
Florida to engage in a war with the remnant of Indians in that State,” although he also believed 
that an even larger portion of the white citizens held the opposite inclination.49 Another aspect of 
the Third Seminole War that largely has been overlooked by scholars is the differences between 
Florida’s settlers, many of whom had a personal interest in seeing the Seminoles removed, and 
the federal soldiers and officials, who often conducted their duty with seeming indifference, but 
sometimes also expressed disdain for the state’s white population. Major Justus McKinstry, upon 
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arriving in South Florida in late 1855, noted in a letter that “The ‘Crackers’ of Florida seem 
delighted at the prospect of another Indian war in their midst.” But McKinstry considered the 
endeavor unworthy of the effort and that the value of land in South Florida had been falsely 
inflated, concluding that, “If Uncle Samuel had an eye to his own interest he would present the 
country to Billy,” since “The dime is about the value of the peninsula south of this river (the 
Caloosahatchee)”50  
 Canova was not the only ex-soldier who fought in the Third Seminole War and penned a 
memoir of some sort years later, and Justus McKinstry was not the only federal soldier to 
criticize Florida’s white citizens. John T. Greble was born in Philadelphia, rose to the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel, and was killed in the early days of the Civil War while fighting for Union 
forces. Greble, as previously noted, also served in Florida as one of the army’s mapmakers prior 
to the outbreak of the Third Seminole War and his comments on the conflict are found in his 
memoir, transcribed and edited by his biographer, Benson J. Lossing. Greble felt that the 
“planters and speculators” of Florida and Georgia were to blame for both the Second and Third 
Seminole Wars, and in a passage found in a letter to his parents, he describes the circumstances 
from his perspective: “The Indians are perfectly peaceable, and are the best inhabitants of the 
State, according to my way of thinking. I will not conceal from you, however, that it is the 
intention of the government to have them out of Florida. A group of politicians have represented 
that the country occupied by the Indians is the most fruitful in the world – good land for coffee 
plantations, spice-groves, and all that – and the Indians, accordingly, have to vacate, unless they 
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change their minds in Washington when they learn the true nature of the country.”51 Presumably, 
some of the same “planter-politicians” featured in Baptist’s study of “Middle Florida” were also 
directly involved in passing the laws and measures against the Seminoles and investing in plans 
for the use of lands in South Florida, but a scholarly attempt to connect the two subjects has not 
been undertaken as of yet. Neither Greble, nor his biographer Lossing, directly mentioned the 
opening Seminole attack of the war, but Lossing notes that Hartsuff was Greble’s “fellow 
academician” and was “engaged” in “that service,” referring to the war.52 Lossing also quotes at 
length a glowing eulogy written by Hartsuff on the occasion of Greble’s death which suggests 
that the two may have been close friends, but this piece of evidence and the omission of the 
banana plant story do not necessarily have any impact on the accuracy of Canova’s 
interpretation.     
  Another ex-federal soldier, Loomis L. Langdon, provided his perspective on the Third 
Seminole War in Florida when he was asked to author some personal reminiscences of his time 
in the U.S. Army for the The History of the First Regiment of Artillery (1879), compiled by 
William L. Haskin. Langdon was born in Buffalo, New York, rose to the rank of Brigadier 
General, and fought for the Union in the Civil War. During his tenure in Florida, he actually 
served under Greble for a time and offered views similar to those of his commanding officer as 
to the reasons why the army was sent in to survey the Seminole lands. Langdon wrote that “The 
whites on the western side of Florida were forbidden to invade the lands reserved to the Indians, 
but they had cast longing eyes to that region as pasture ground for their cattle, and indeed, 
officials had been sent in there to make maps of the country.” Unlike Greble, Langdon does 
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discuss the Seminole attack, calling it “Hartsuff’s massacre.” In his brief description of the event, 
Langdon wrote that Hartsuff’s unit “was surprised early one morning by Bowlegs and half his 
party killed, he himself being badly wounded, and only escaping after lying hidden till after 
nightfall up to his neck in a swamp.”53 Although four dead out of eleven is not quite half of the 
party, Langdon may have just been simplifying matters for his readers since his description of 
Hartsuff’s escape method suggests that he did have intimate knowledge of the attack. But 
Langdon, like Greble, simply does not mention anything regarding the soldiers’ movements or 
actions in the days before the Seminole attack. Langdon does offer some interesting insight into 
the way that soldiers remember and retell war stories, which may also shed some light on 
Canova’s interpretation. Langdon prefaced his memoirs with this warning to readers regarding 
the writings of ex-soldiers: “I have written all the more freely, perhaps, from remembering that 
when seated around the campfire, each contributing his part to the entertainment of the evening, 
none of us ever have our fluency checked by the thought that we are being criticized.”54  
John M. Schofield was born in western New York State, fought for the Union in the Civil 
War, and rose to Secretary of War under President Andrew Johnson before retiring as the 
Commanding General of the U.S. Army. Schofield also served in Florida and wrote about is 
experiences in Forty-Six Years in the Army (1897). He notes that he “was ordered out of Florida 
before the Seminoles found out what the plans of the War Department were.” While it may be 
easily dismissed as an insignificant and passing remark, Schofield seems to suggest that the plan 
to survey and sell land near the Indian reserve was enough to prompt the Seminoles to war. 
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Schofield refers to Hartsuff as one of his “most intimate friends,” and describes the attack on his 
unit briefly before attributing it to “bad luck.”55 Like Greble and Langdon, Schofield did not 
cover any events that occurred just prior to the Seminole assault.  
Yet another veteran of the Third Seminole War who published a memoir, Campaigning 
in Florida in 1855 (1909), was Alexander Webb. Webb was born in New York City, served as a 
Union General in the Civil War, and received a Medal of Honor for gallantry at the Battle of 
Gettysburg. Concerning the Seminole assault, Webb wrote that Bowlegs “had, without any 
provocation on the part of the United States troops, attacked and murdered part of Lieutenant 
Hartsuff’s command and severely wounded the lieutenant.”56 Webb’s insistence on the lack of 
provocation by the U.S. troops could have been a direct response to the account offered by 
Canova since Webb’s memoir was written well after Canova’s book, and even after the books by 
Coe and Moore-Willson, or it could simply be because that is the way he remembered it.  
Regarding Florida’s white citizens, while Greble placed blame with the planters and 
speculators and Langdon pointed to the desires of cattlemen, Webb echoed McKinstry’s 
assessment concerning the poor “Cracker Jack” settlers: “The white population of lower Florida 
and middle Florida was as ignorant and lawless as the Indian, and was largely dependent upon 
the money paid to the soldiers quartered in their vicinity for their support.”57 Webb makes a 
compelling point regarding the economic influx that often accompanied Indian wars and 
Removal efforts in the nineteenth century. Historian John Ellisor referred to the phenomenon as 
“Indian business” in his study, The Second Creek War (2010), a subject which has many 
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similarities and parallels to all three Seminole Wars. While most whites in Florida simply wanted 
the Seminoles removed as quickly as possible by the 1850s, there were others who stood to gain 
financially. Cattlemen stood to gain two-fold: by having the Indians removed, more land would 
be available for grazing and in the interim a market for beef would be created by the influx of 
soldiers and activity. A man identified as “Captain Finegan” was accused by a visitor from 
Massachusetts of attempting to incite “another Indian War” for the sole purpose of selling beef to 
the army.58 And a Tampa settler commented years later that once the war began in late 1855, his 
family got into the freight business in order to supply goods to the troops, and “Things around 
Tampa began to be active and quite a lot of money was placed in circulation.”59 
Many of Florida’s white citizens were eager to form militia units with the hopes of 
having a hand in vanquishing the Seminoles left in the state while also receiving government pay 
for their efforts. But the volunteer militias were often less than ideal fighting forces. During the 
frontier panic of 1849-1850, Secretary of War Crawford chided Florida Governor Thomas 
Brown for the mustering of volunteer companies without proper authority.60 In 1852, some of 
Florida’s civilian soldiers received criticism for the forceful seizure of several Indians who had 
wandered beyond the boundary of their reserve.61 And in the early months of the war, the state 
militia was plagued by poor organization, the refusal of some companies to perform foot patrols, 
the distrust of some frontier settlers, and the incompetence of some officers.62 But later in the 
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war, the state militia redeemed itself by locating many of the Seminoles’ hidden villages, and is 
often credited with helping to bring about an end to the conflict with their use of boat patrols.63 
Besides Canova, the only other Florida volunteer soldier to leave behind a written record of his 
experiences was Francis C. M. Boggess, who published A Veteran of Four Wars in 1900.  
In his autobiography, Boggess discusses his family’s history, which included an 
accumulation and subsequent loss of wealth due to the fluctuating market prices in the cotton 
industry. Boggess relates his difficulties in finding employment in Florida, and his reluctant 
acceptance of a teaching job, although “school teaching was repugnant” to him. He went on to 
detail his involvement with the Florida militia, and like Canova, claimed to provide a 
“Heretofore Unwritten History of the Florida Seminole Indian Wars.” Boggess, unlike all of the 
federal soldiers whose writings were discussed previously, did include the banana plant account, 
and even the assertion that Bowlegs “and Lieutenant Hartsuff had a quarrel and Hartsuff kicked 
him down the steps.” What makes this work unique is that Boggess claims to have been in 
Hartsuff’s company “for forty days after he recovered…and has heard him relate the fight and all 
the particulars. Lieutenant Hartsuff said all he wished was to come up with Billy Bowlegs.”64 
The implication that Hartsuff held a personal grievance toward the Seminole chief is not 
surprising, nor is the revelation that Hartsuff may have believed that the actions of his men 
caused the attack. Despite the apparent confirmation of Canova’s interpretation, there are several 
factors that diminish the credibility of Boggess’ work. A Veteran of Four Wars was published 
fifteen years after Canova’s work, and a few years after the works of Moore-Willson and Coe. It 
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is possible that Boggess could have heard the tale straight from Hartsuff, or from other persons 
in the years after the war, but the phrasing that he uses in his book suggests that he had already 
seen the account in print, and that by 1900, the banana plant story was mostly common 
knowledge, at least to Floridians. In addition, Boggess claims that “Hartsuff killed four Indians” 
during the ambush, but in the official report of the incident, the commanding officer admits that 
it was not known by the American troops if any Seminoles had been killed or not.65 It would 
seem that Boggess’ knowledge of the Seminole assault was not as all-encompassing as he would 
have liked his readers to believe. Although he does not mention Canova directly, Boggess may 
have had an interest in supporting the claim of his fellow volunteer, or at least, that the two men 
shared similar backgrounds and outlooks that made them more susceptible to having been 
familiar with, and having faith in the accuracy of the banana plant account.   
The division of white society in Florida along class lines is a prominent feature of 
Baptist’s study Creating an Old South, and while struggles for political and social power played 
out in North Florida (then commonly known as Middle Florida), these aspects of white society 
were much less significant in terms of the Third Seminole War. That the actions and attitudes of 
the newly professionalized federal soldiers compared and contrasted with Florida’s volunteer 
militia and civilian population, however, represents a potentially fruitful avenue for further 
scholarly investigation. In addition to the number of federal soldiers born in the northern United 
States, many of the troops in Florida were born outside of the United States. At Fort Dallas 
(Miami) in 1850, seventy percent of the soldiers were foreign-born.66 Abner Doubleday loathed 
the “German or Irish emigrants who finding themselves penniless in our large cities had enlisted 
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to get bread,” and who “were no match for the savages.”67 And a Captain L.A. Hardee 
commented on a violent confrontation between a lieutenant of the Florida militia and a sergeant 
of the federal army, before the “threat of war between Regulars and Volunteers was quelled.”68 
The cultural and class makeup of the American soldiers during this war has been ignored by 
historians, but is important to consider for this topic since the most common interpretation comes 
from a volunteer soldier (Canova), and the often conflicting attitudes of the men who fought in 
the war is worth careful consideration.  
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter’s analysis of the primary records regarding the opening attack of the Third 
Seminole War highlights what some previous historians likely learned for themselves as well: 
that the available sources do not yield any definitive answers concerning the Seminoles’ precise 
motivations for their assault on Hartsuff’s unit. However, conclusions may still be reached 
through a close textual analysis of the surviving soldiers’ reports, and the contextual clues 
evidenced by the Seminoles’ actions prior to the attack. Hartsuff’s troops were uniformly 
convinced that no significant number of Seminoles were in the vicinity of their patrol, and they 
all insisted that they were taken completely by surprise by the attack. Their official statements 
indicate that the U.S. soldiers were certainly not looking to “pick a fight” with the Indians, like 
some authors since have claimed. Had the troops been expecting retaliation for their actions in 
Bowlegs’ abandoned garden, they also likely would have defended their encampment more 
securely.  
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 Regardless of the actions of Hartsuff’s soldiers during their reconnaissance, two pieces of 
evidence indicate that the Seminole attack was almost certainly premeditated. For one, the 
burning of Forts Drum and Shakelford, which were the newest forts and were closer to the 
Seminole towns than any other U.S. strongholds, was a clear sign of hostile intentions. The 
Seminoles likely considered the army’s patrols as unacceptable intrusions onto their lands, and a 
violation of General Worth’s 1842 agreement. And two, the relocation of all of the nearby Indian 
towns prior to the winter dry season of 1855-1856 was another ominous, and seemingly obvious 
indication that relations with the Seminoles were severely troubled. Had the Seminoles not 
relocated their villages prior to the assault, it would have been much more difficult to remain 
hidden in the swamps for as long as they were able to. Additional Seminole actions, reactions, 
and general behaviors are addressed further in the following chapter.  
An examination of the writings and memoirs penned by ex-soldiers, again, does not yield 
much in the way of definitive conclusions, but a few points should be noted. It is interesting and 
perhaps quite significant that only Canova’s fellow volunteer militiaman, Boggess, corroborated 
his story concerning the banana garden. Conversely, none of the former federal troops mentioned 
the banana story in their writings, and some even explicitly blamed Florida’s planters, 
speculators, and cattlemen for indirectly instigating the war. This suggests that perhaps the 
banana plant story was initially only well-known and popular amongst Floridians, including 
those who fought in the volunteer militia. As D.B. McKay pointed out, the tale “was widely 
current among the pioneers.”69 Whether or not the account was “widely current” before or after 
the publication of Canova’s book is uncertain, but it seems likely that Canova was the sole 
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source of the story, and that it only became well-known to Floridians following his work, and the 
works of Moore-Willson and Coe.  
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CHAPTER 4: OTHER POSSIBLE CATALYSTS: REASSESSING 
SEMINOLE PERSPECTIVES 
 Despite the scarcity of source material that contains the perspectives of the Florida 
Seminoles, interpretations of their viewpoints can still be achieved by using the available records 
in a slightly different manner. By focusing on the Seminoles’ actions, reactions, past 
experiences, and general behaviors, conclusions may be reached that shed light on their possible 
motivations and goals. While the voices of the Florida Seminoles are mostly silent in the sources, 
the perspectives and desires of the Western branch of the tribe are better known, but historians of 
the Third Seminole War have virtually ignored the impact that the larger portion of the tribe may 
have had on those still in Florida. The events and circumstances in Indian Territory, and how 
they may have affected the decisions of the Florida Seminoles, are analyzed here as well.   
 
Seminole Actions and Reactions 
One method for analyzing the possible reasons behind the Seminole attack of December 
20, 1855, is to compare the incident to the previous Seminole killings in 1849-1850, when 
seemingly similar circumstances prevailed. The murders in 1849 and 1850 were immediately 
disavowed by the entire Seminole tribe and were explained as isolated incidents related to 
personal disputes. The Seminole attack in 1855 shared the same basic characteristics as the 
earlier killings; it was an act of immediate retribution committed without the knowledge or 
sanction of the rest of tribe, if Canova’s account is to be trusted. But the Seminoles’ actions in 
the aftermath of the various violent episodes highlight the drastically altered situation in 1855. 
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By all accounts, in 1849-1850 Bowlegs and the other Seminole leaders went above and beyond 
expectations by capturing the Indian killers themselves and turning them over for punishment.   
But in 1855, there was no Seminole apology or promise of justice, although Canova 
would have us believe that the forces of personal insult and revenge were still the primary 
factors. If the assault of 1855 was truly a short-sighted act of retaliation, then why did no 
Seminole leaders come forward to renounce the attack? It could be supposed that Bowlegs had 
the ability through his influence to quell any Indian criticism of the ambush. But despite the 
factional nature of the various Indian bands, all of the villages in the area of the Big Cypress 
Swamp had been relocated prior to the winter dry season of 1855-1856 and the Seminole 
ambush, as Hartsuff’s team had learned. Even during the last few months of the spring dry 
season in 1855, the army scouts began reporting that in the area between Fort Myers and the Big 
Cypress Swamp, few Indians were seen, as “They had generally abandoned their homes and 
sought to avoid the Troops.”1 This suggests that all of the Indians in the vicinity were well-aware 
of, and in agreement regarding, hostile intentions towards the surveying soldiers. As noted 
previously, the abandoned villages and the burned forts were a clear indication of an unsettled 
situation.  
Although the work of writer John Parrish suggests that Chief Chipco was opposed to the 
use of force, he and his band were at least made aware of the intentions of the remainder of the 
tribe at the Seminole council meeting in the fall of 1855. Unlike the murders in 1849 and 1850 
when the Seminoles were left vulnerable to reprisal due to the undeclared and unsanctioned 
actions of the outsiders, in 1855, the entire tribe seemed well prepared for the American response 
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since they had all moved their villages to more secure locations. And following the opening of 
the war, one of the first orders given to military personnel in the field stated that “All Indians met 
with will be considered as hostile.”2 It did not matter to U.S. officials that some members of the 
tribe may have been against violent measures; that the attack was upon federal soldiers meant 
that the response would be swifter and more severe than the reaction to the previous killings. The 
Seminoles would have been acutely aware of the likely federal response and it would have been 
practically a necessity for Bowlegs to secure effective hiding places for the new villages prior to 
the attack on Hartsuff’s unit, or else large portions of the tribe would have been left exposed, and 
easily captured or killed.  
After the assault in late 1855, the subsequent war targets chosen by the Seminoles 
provide further evidence that a campaign of warfare was planned well before Hartsuff’s fated 
patrol. From January 6, 1856 until June 14, 1856, small groups of Seminoles coordinated attacks 
on at least eleven different targets all over the state, ranging from Fort Dallas (Miami), to Pasco 
County (north of Tampa). Even without further evidence it seems unlikely that such a lengthy 
and far-reaching campaign of violence would be undertaken solely in response to a personal 
insult involving garden vandalism. Covington claims that the “Seminole raids were not planned 
in great detail but arranged more on the spur of the moment…against relatively unprotected 
places,”3 but the evidence indicates that the Seminoles may have chosen certain targets for very 
specific reasons, and some were actually quite well-protected. An assault on the home of 
plantation owner Dr. Joseph Braden, known as “Braden Castle” for its fortified defenses, was 
repelled by the inhabitants but the Seminoles were able to seize seven African slaves, several 
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mules, and some food and supplies, which may have been their primary purpose in the attack 
anyway. In addition, the Seminoles made several assaults upon relatively well-protected wagon 
trains for the purpose of procuring much needed supplies and another attack may have been an 
act of personal revenge stemming from events that occurred back during the Second Seminole 
War.4  
Many authors, including Covington, portray Seminole strategy as guerilla in nature, and 
comprised solely of the intention to spread fear and panic along the South Florida frontier 
through random attacks and bloodshed. But historian Samuel Watson warns that “references to 
‘guerilla warfare’ are far too vague…to assess Seminole military strategy,” and “do not do 
justice to the rationality, vision, complexity, and dilemmas of the Seminole war effort.”5 The 
failure of historians to analyze Seminole military strategy is another byproduct of the same 
mindset behind the banana plant theory: the intrinsic intellectual inferiority of Native peoples, 
whether consciously recognized or not.  
 
Seminole Allies 
While a handful of white Floridians and federal soldiers voiced their support in favor of 
the Seminoles’ cause, the Florida Indians did have other allies who are virtually silent in the 
documentary evidence. Cuban fishermen and traders were known to have kept up a reciprocal 
relationship with the Seminole people and supplied them with arms, ammunition, and liquor, 
items often denied them by Florida’s government. “Spanish Fisheries of Charlotte Harbor” 
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(1973), by E. A. Hammond, addresses the topic during an earlier period and focuses primarily on 
the prevalence of Seminole Indians taking work in the Spanish fisheries along the southwest 
Florida coast.6 According to the U.S. government, all Florida Indians were barred from visiting 
the shorelines on either coast for any reason. But evidence shows that in addition to the Spanish 
fishing villages, cattle drives on the west coast and “contraband trade” on the east coast were 
maintained by the Seminoles throughout this period.7  
Another small piece of evidence that suggests a strong bond of trust between the 
Seminoles and some of the Cubans and Spaniards in the area concerns the panic of 1849-1850. 
When John Casey attempted to contact Bowlegs and the other Seminole leaders, he placed 
tokens of peace in the Spanish fishing villages along the coast where the Indians were likely to 
find them. And when Bowlegs decided to answer Casey’s call, it was Cuban John Felipe 
Bermudez who acted as intermediary after Bowlegs placed a white flag on the door of his fishing 
hut in Sarasota Bay. Bermudez was said to have “lived on most friendly terms with the Indians; 
but, having also been in free intercourse with the whites, abandoned his property” after the 
Seminole murders had occurred in the area. It is interesting to note that Bermudez was on good 
terms with both the white settlers and the Seminoles, and before Casey was able to confirm that 
the peace sign left by Bowlegs was intended for him, he also considered that the white flag could 
have possibly been a direct message to Bermudez, “as an assurance of his own security.”8 The 
exact role that was played by the Seminoles’ Cuba-based allies during the period represents 
                                                 
6 E. A. Hammond, “The Spanish Fisheries of Charlotte Harbor,” Florida Historical Quarterly 51, no. 4 (April 
1973): 355-380.  
7 Haines to Cooper, October 10, 1854, Letters Sent, Troops in Florida. 
8 Morris to Jones, August 20, 1849, Relative to Hostilities, 59-60.  
107 
 
another untapped area of research, and perhaps primary source material found in either Cuba or 
Key West would yield even more insight into the subject.  
Although the majority of white Floridians were unified in their contempt for the 
Seminole Indians, the previous analysis highlights that the situation was not such a clear “white 
versus red” issue. Even within the Florida state militia, Canova himself notes the existence of 
“half-breeds” and “Spaniards” fighting with the volunteers, which further illustrates the multi-
cultural makeup on both sides of the conflict. And of course, the Seminoles’ relationships with 
free Africans and slaves is always an intriguing but complex piece of the historical puzzle, but as 
yet no historian has examined their specific affiliation for the period of the Third Seminole War.   
 
Seminole Agriculture 
Despite the position of this thesis that an alleged incident of garden destruction did not 
cause the Third Seminole War, the importance and significance of agriculture to the Seminole 
culture should not be dismissed all together without some analysis. In addition to hunting game 
and grazing cattle, the cultivation of crops was vitally important to the Seminoles’ sustenance 
and way of life. In 1847, Captain John Sprague reported that thanks to “The game of the country, 
climate and natural productions…every necessary want is supplied. Corn, pumpkins, potatoes, 
beans and peas are raised fresh.”9 In the years prior to the Third Seminole War, Indians would 
often bring fruit and other goods to exchange at the area’s trading posts, including the Kennedy 
and Darling store.10 Even into the early decades of the twentieth century, Seminoles would still 
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bring excess “garden produce” to barter with at trading posts.11 And in the scouting reports of the 
American soldiers who conducted reconnaissance and patrols before and during the Third war, 
references abound to fields of cultivated crops being found, up to twenty acres worth in one 
instance.12 Historian Knetsch speculates that the success of the Seminoles’ crops may have even 
inspired a level of envy among Florida’s white settlers.13 
Even Canova commented on the fertility of the area and the abundance of wild fruit, 
despite his insistence that Bowlegs’ banana plants were somehow a special exception. Canova 
asserted that the “region may be termed, with propriety, the home of the banana, for frost 
seldom, if ever, enters the dominion of the Big Cypress” (my emphasis). “Banana plants, fifteen 
feet or more in height, and immense corn, were among the products of this fertile region.”14 In 
addition, it was well-known that the tribe’s women were responsible for planting crops, 
preparing meals, and tending to livestock, while the men primarily hunted game, a reality even 
acknowledged by Canova.15 If a typical Seminole man did not engage in the cultivation of crops, 
then it seems doubly unlikely that a chief with the prestige and responsibilities of Bowlegs would 
have “reared” his banana plants “with parental care,” as Canova suggested. Another detail of 
Seminole farming practices serves to further undermine Canova’s account: Once the women 
planted a set of crops, “they would allow wild plants to mingle with their crops in the fertile soil. 
For this reason, the land was full of wild fruit and vegetables.”16 While the importance of 
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agriculture to the Florida Seminoles cannot be denied, a deeper contextual analysis reveals the 
extremely doubtful nature of Bowlegs’ personal attachment to his abandoned banana garden, 
especially when much more important issues were at stake, like the survival of his people.   
 
Indian Territory, Seminole-Creek Conflict, and the Need for a Satisfactory Treaty 
In order to more fully understand the reasons why the Florida Seminoles chose to wage 
war against the United States and the people of South Florida in 1855, it is illuminating to look 
beyond the state lines and to consider the broader circumstances. Historical investigations that 
address the Third Seminole War usually adopt one of two approaches. The majority of studies 
focus almost exclusively on local events that occurred in Florida. Other accounts concentrate on 
the majority of the Seminole people, and since a much larger portion of the tribe was sent west 
following the close of the Second Seminole War in 1842, most of these studies barely discuss the 
subsequent events that occurred in Florida. Covington informs us that even two of the best books 
on the history of the Seminole people, Grant Foreman’s Indian Removal (1932), and Edwin 
McReynolds’s The Seminoles (1957), “pay little attention to the Third Seminole War.”17 But 
likewise, Covington, the Missalls, Peters, and most other Florida historians devote hardly any 
space to the circumstances of the Seminoles who had already emigrated west to Indian Territory, 
and the possible impact that their condition had on the motivations and actions of those 
Seminoles still remaining in Florida. Despite the fact that over four decades have passed since 
Covington’s statement, the dichotomy in the literature persists.  Furthermore, the divide in the 
historiography actually parallels the bureaucratic disconnect that existed within the Bureau of 
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Indian Affairs in the years between the Second and Third Seminole Wars and affected their 
efforts to induce the Florida Seminoles to leave the state willingly.  
The annual reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs are an especially useful source 
for gaining insight into the western portion of the Seminole tribe, but this source base has been 
vastly underutilized by historians of the Florida Seminoles. These records contain a wealth of 
information regarding the Seminoles in Indian Territory, where communication and contact with 
government officials was much more frequent than in Florida and more often recorded for 
posterity. The Seminoles’ decision to wage war for a third time in Florida was certainly the result 
of a combination of reasons. But the one factor that receives the least consideration from scholars 
is the condition of the Western Seminoles as they struggled to maintain control of their affairs 
and adjust to their new homes in Indian Territory. The suffering of their kin in the West and the 
destitution that awaited them there may have been the most decisive factor that determined the 
Florida Seminoles’ resolve to remain in the peninsula, even at the risk of open warfare.  
The intense rivalry and factionalism among the Seminole and Creek peoples and their 
complicated history of both conflict and alliance have been well-noted by many historians of 
both tribes. Removal Aftershock (1994), by Jane Lancaster, details the myriad difficulties that 
faced the Seminole migrants after they arrived in their new lands west of the Mississippi River 
following the end of the Second Seminole War, including the continual problems with their 
Creek neighbors. Daniel Littlefield’s Africans and Seminoles: From Removal to Emancipation 
(1977), and Kevin Mulroy’s The Seminole Freedmen: A History (2007), cover much of the same 
ground, but with special emphasis on the Seminoles’ complex relationship with their African 
allies. But what no scholar has undertaken is a study of the reciprocal effect of the circumstances 
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in both Indian Territory and in Florida, and how they may have influenced the Florida 
Seminoles’ decision to wage war in 1855.  In order to analyze the Third Seminole War from this 
perspective, it is helpful to briefly summarize some of the history between the Seminole and 
Creek tribes and their primary source of contention. Prominent historian of the Indian Removal 
era, Grant Foreman, explained the origins of the Creek Seminole divergence in these terms: 
“When the Creek Indians made their first treaty with the United States on August 7, 
1790, in order to placate the people of Georgia, the government induced the Indians to 
promise the return to the whites of all negroes living among the Seminole. The latter 
declared that the Creeks had no control over them and repudiated their undertaking. This 
claim of the whites and the promise of the Creeks and their assumption of authority over 
the Seminole, were destined to influence profoundly the history of these people.”18  
Indeed, disputes between Seminoles and Creeks involving the status of so-called “Black 
Seminoles” only continued and intensified in Indian Territory, where the disparate groups were 
compelled to coexist by U.S. government dictates, and where “civilized tribes” like the 
Cherokees and Creeks began to engage more heavily in chattel slavery.  
 During the Second Seminole War in Florida, General Thomas Jesup and other military 
commanders often made promises of freedom to the African Seminoles if they would separate 
from their Indian allies.19 The ambiguous legal status of these Africans would prove to be a 
constant source of conflict once they were sent west to Indian Territory. Jesup had also 
contracted several hundred Creek warriors to fight against the Seminoles, and allowed them to 
retain any African slaves that they may have captured in the process. When the first sizable 
group of Seminole emigrants arrived in Indian Territory in 1838, they found that their allotted 
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lands were already occupied by some of the very same Creeks who had waged war against them 
and captured many of their African allies.20  
 By January 1839, as the Second Seminole War still continued in Florida, communications 
had reached President Martin Van Buren’s desk concerning the strained Creek-Seminole 
relationship in the West. The President asked for “the early consideration and favorable action of 
Congress,” with regards to providing the Seminoles with their own tract of land, “so that they 
may be separated from the Creeks.”21 The Secretary of War had pointed out to Van Buren that, 
“Humanity, as well as sound policy, requires that the wants of those people should be promptly 
attended to; and it appears but just, as they are obstinately opposed to unite with the Creeks.”22 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas Crawford, noted that “their destitution, in regard to 
clothing…is extreme. They are said to almost naked.” Crawford also believed that a resolution 
would be fairly simple, since “All that is required is legal authority to change their location, and 
a fund to give them some small amount of clothing.”23 While a new area for settlement away 
from the Creeks, and clothing, was paramount in the short-term, what the Western Seminoles 
really desired was complete tribal autonomy, which would allow them to better protect their 
African slaves, who were really more akin to tributary allies than chattel slaves.24 The Seminoles 
would come to discover though that concessions made to them by the U.S. government would 
proceed slowly and incrementally and would often take years to be realized. 
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 Back in Florida, the Second Seminole War was winding down, and in late 1842, as noted 
previously, General William Worth concluded a “temporary arrangement” to allow those 
Seminoles still in Florida to remain “for a while.” The Indians were to confine themselves to a 
designated area in the southern portion of the peninsula and refrain from any acts of violence. 
With the majority of the tribe already sent west to Indian Territory, Worth determined that 
hostilities no longer existed, and that through his efforts the “thorough pacification” of the 
territory had been achieved. Bowlegs accepted the concession on behalf of all of the Florida 
Indians, although he did not actually represent all of the different bands left in the State, as 
Worth reported.25  
 In 1844, the new Secretary of War, William Wilkins, sent a dispatch to Worth explaining, 
“Notwithstanding the President of the United States places firm reliance upon your official 
reports in reference to the present condition of the Seminoles in Florida, and is fully impressed 
with the belief that under your command a safe and pacific disposition has been established and 
manifested amongst those Indians, yet, it is thought that the safer policy requires their removal. 
Their emigration would be an act of humanity towards the Indian.” Worth was ordered to 
immediately make arrangements to negotiate for removal with the remaining Seminoles, but to 
avoid military force, resorting alone to the “arts of persuasion.” Wilkins knew that the foremost 
concern of the Florida Seminoles would be the circumstances that awaited them in the West. He 
instructed Worth, “In making your arrangements for the emigration, the Indians will be informed 
that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs is now in progress with a negotiation by Commissioners 
to adjust the difficulties that have heretofore disturbed both the Creeks and Seminoles…West of 
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the Mississippi, and that final measures will be adopted, very probably this fall, by the 
government to assign or secure homes for the future residence of the Seminoles according to 
their wishes.”26 However, Worth was not able to deliver this message of assurance as the various 
Indian bands in Florida uniformly agreed not to engage in any negotiations with government 
officials during this period. The Seminoles expected that if they abided by the terms of Worth’s 
agreement, they should be able to remain in the state.  
 Meanwhile, events in Indian Territory moved towards a seeming resolution as it became 
more and more apparent that the Creeks and Seminoles needed to have their differences 
reconciled in some manner. In 1844, Commissioner Crawford conceded that, in addition to a 
separate tract of land and “a small amount of clothing,” the Seminoles also greatly desired to 
have their property rights guaranteed, as Crawford explained, “Their fears…are especially 
pointed to their slave property, to a part of which, and perhaps to much of which, the Creeks lay 
claim.”27 The Creek General Council had begun to pass slave codes that denied the right of 
slaves to own property such as horses and guns, and the Seminole chiefs became concerned that 
the Creeks would attempt to extend these laws to the Seminoles’ African American slaves.28 
Some Creeks also began to press their legal claims to Seminole slaves, while others participated 
in outright slave raids. Although it was well known to U.S. officials that the Seminoles 
desperately wanted to be provided, “with a country exclusively their own, and under their own 
distinct and exclusive jurisdiction,” Crawford also noted that the Seminoles’ “state of deplorable 
                                                 
26 Wilkins to Worth, October 18, 1844, Territorial Papers of Florida, 967-968. 
27 Crawford to Armstrong, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for the Year 1844, April 10, 1844, 
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28 Littlefield, Africans and Seminoles, 74.  
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destitution,” led him to believe that incorporating the Creeks and Seminoles “as one people,” 
could still be accomplished. 29 
The Seminoles were reported to still, “utterly repudiate the idea of becoming a 
constituent part of the Creek nation, or submitting to the Creek laws in the remotest degree.”30 
Despite this, the Western Seminoles agreed to new treaty on January 8, 1845, which, 
surprisingly, did not grant them tribal autonomy or the ability to completely govern their own 
affairs, but did offer new lands for settlement further away from most Creeks. One reason for 
this, as the Superintendent had predicted, was their continued destitution, compounded by 
extensive floods in the summer of 1844 that devastated their ability to raise crops. Peer pressure 
may have provided another reason for the Seminoles’ acceptance of the 1845 treaty. A series of 
pan-Indian congresses were held in Indian Territory beginning in 1838, and at an 1845 council 
meeting, called by Creek “peace makers,” a spirit of cooperation was evident, as were “genuine 
expressions of Indian friendship and goodwill, a concern ventured by several delegates over the 
erasure of Indian culture, and the earnest appeals that tribal ways be preserved in the face of the 
disintegrating impact of Anglo culture.”31   
Although the 1845 treaty also allowed the Seminoles to create and administer their own 
“town laws,” they had to acknowledge, “the supremacy of the Creek general council,” which 
required them to refrain from passing any laws that conflicted with Creek authority.32 This meant 
that disputes over the legal status of the African American Seminoles would almost certainly 
continue. The strong bond between the Seminoles and African Americans became strained after 
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this time, due in large part to the concessions made by the Seminoles in the Treaty of 1845.33 
Nevertheless, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs declared that the treaty was, “highly 
gratifying,” and it was, “hoped that now these Indians…may become a contented and happy 
people.”34  
 The Seminoles in Indian Territory were well aware that their kin still remaining in 
Florida could serve as an invaluable bargaining tool in their continued attempts to gain complete 
independence in the West. In 1845, new Seminole Agent Marcellus Duval reported that the 
Seminoles desired their Florida brethren to emigrate west, “and would assist in persuading them 
to do so.”35 Events occurring back in Florida would soon influence U.S. officials to take them up 
on their offer of assistance.   
 Following the many demands for the remaining Seminoles to be removed by any means 
necessary, the state’s legislature began to pass laws intended to apply pressure on them to 
emigrate. In 1849, the governor approved a measure that barred the Seminoles from leaving their 
reserve for any reason, and declared that anyone caught selling them liquor would be subject to 
fines. A small group of four to five Seminoles responded to these measures by launching violent 
attacks on white settlers in 1849 and 1850, killing a total of four people. In response, federal 
authorities developed a three-part plan to force the Seminoles’ removal that included the use of 
financial temptations, a large military presence in South Florida, and the negotiating skill of the 
Western Seminole delegates.36  
                                                 
33 Littlefield, Africans and Seminoles, 91.  
34 Medill to Marcy, November 24, 1845, Annual Report 1845, 449.  
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 However, the Western Seminole delegation’s visit to Florida in early 1850 did not 
produce the desired result and actually seemed to strengthen the resolve of the Florida 
Seminoles. The situation regarding the Seminole attacks had been largely defused, at least 
temporarily, thanks to the tactful diplomacy of the Indian Agent Casey and Chief Bowlegs, who 
arranged to have the Seminole perpetrators turned over to U.S. authorities. Bowlegs had hoped 
that his cooperation in capturing the Seminole culprits would allow his people to remain in 
Florida.  
Agent Duval had selected for the Florida delegation those Seminole leaders who most 
favored a complete reunion of all members of the tribe. Duval worried though, that for the 
delegates to, “give a very favorable account of this country (Indian Territory) is very 
problematic: if they speak of it to them as they do to me, the country would be no inducement for 
the others to remove.”37 After his delegation reached Florida, Duval received no specific 
instructions from Washington regarding the exact terms he was to offer. And consequently, the 
commanding officer of military operations in Florida, General David Twiggs, took the lead in the 
negotiations. The General was only able to offer financial inducements, and did convince 74 
Indians to leave Florida. Despite being offered $10,000 personally, Bowlegs and the balance of 
the tribe would not consider leaving Florida, however. Casey reported that he saw “no hope of 
inducing these people to go West in a body by any pecuniary temptation,”38 perhaps implying 
that what Bowlegs and the Florida Seminoles truly desired was not money, but rather treaty 
concessions. Although there is no record of the Florida Seminoles’ ever explicitly stating that 
their primary objection to removal was the continued strife between the Creeks and Seminoles in 
                                                 
37 Duval, May 23, 1849, Relative to Hostilities, 49.  
38 Wallace, “The Story of Captain John C. Casey,” 135.  
118 
 
Indian Territory, the western delegation would have made them aware of the situation. So the 
failure of the federal government to resolve the situation in Indian Territory, coupled with the 
failure to communicate direct terms and assurances to the Florida Seminoles, were largely to 
blame for preventing the removal of the Florida Indians in the early 1850s.  
In preparing the delegation for their journey to Florida, Agent Duval uncovered a secret 
plot hatched by Seminole leader Wildcat (Coacoochee). Wildcat wanted the Seminole people to 
go a step further than simply demanding their own slice of Indian Territory; he had desires to 
move the entire Seminole nation completely out of the United States and into Mexico, along the 
Rio Grande. He attempted to send a secret message to the Florida Seminoles with instructions to 
“‘hold on,’ that is, not remove until removal becomes so great an object to government, as to 
induce it to give him a large amount, or make a treaty.” Wildcat hoped that the Western 
Seminoles, “who, jointly with the Florida chiefs will make a treaty for a country on the Rio 
Grande, thereby getting away from the neighborhood of the Creeks.”39 With his secret plan 
foiled, Wildcat and roughly one hundred followers fled Indian Territory and established a 
military colony in Mexico, along with approximately one thousand Kickapoo Indians. Wildcat’s 
scheme may have been over-reaching and impractical at the time, but it highlights the potential 
negotiation strategies that the Western Seminole delegations may have discussed with their 
Florida brethren. We simply cannot know for certain whether the Florida Seminoles were ever 
again asked to “hold on” by the Seminoles in the West until satisfactory treaty concessions could 
be elicited from the U.S. government. Despite the logical likelihood that both branches of the 
Seminole people engaged in mutually beneficial discourse when they were able to converse with 
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one another, no historian has yet suggested such a connection between the need for a new treaty 
in the West, and the Third Seminole War in Florida.  
 In 1851, Duval noted the unalleviated suffering of the Seminole people in the West, as 
“Their numbers continue to decrease,” partly because, “The crops this year are unusually small, 
owing to the unprecedented drought. Their unwillingness to submit to Creek laws or Creek 
authority still continues,” and furthermore, “They are perfectly aware of the importance to the 
government of their cooperation,” in persuading the remaining Florida Seminoles to join them in 
the West. And in this role of removal negotiators, they perceived, “the means to claim from the 
government that position as a nation, and that protection in their rights, which they deem of the 
first importance.”40 
 The Seminoles got their next opportunity in 1852 when another delegation was organized 
to travel to Florida. As previously mentioned, Bowlegs and a few other leaders were 
subsequently taken on a trip to New York City and to Washington D.C., where the chief even 
promised President Millard Fillmore that he would do his best to influence the remainder of the 
tribe in Florida to emigrate west.41 Even though the Western Seminoles were able to 
communicate that the circumstances in Indian Territory had been dire, but once again, seemed to 
be moving towards a resolution, the majority of the Florida Seminoles were still unwilling to 
take their chances in the West. One reason for their reluctance was the continued disputes over 
slave property. Even Duval was accused of actively participating in slave raids, reportedly 
kidnapping seven of Bowlegs’ African slaves while the 1852 delegation was away from Indian 
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Territory. Duval’s activities prevented him from acting on behalf of the Seminoles, especially 
since he had a personal investment in ensuring that they remained under Creek authority.42  
 In 1854, another Seminole delegation from the West traveled to Florida, and this time 
Bowlegs asserted that he had decided to never leave Florida under any circumstances. Regardless 
of the still unresolved situation in Indian Territory, the new Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, 
developed a program that would place enormous pressure on the Florida Seminoles. Davis’ plan 
included the imposition of a complete trade embargo, the survey and sale of lands immediately 
bordering the Indian reserve, and an increased military presence to open forts, build roads, and 
make extensive patrols deep into the South Florida swamps.43 The ensuing intrusions into their 
territory led a portion of the Florida Seminoles to initiate a campaign of warfare to resist the 
harassing tactics employed by the U.S. military. The Third Seminole War began on December 
20, 1855, when warriors from Bowlegs’ band ambushed one of the Army’s surveying crews.  
 With open hostilities resumed in Florida, it seemed that the Seminoles finally had the 
government’s full attention. Less than a year later, on August 7, 1856, a new treaty was entered 
into by representatives of the Western Seminoles, the Creeks, and the United States. New 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, George Manypenny, explained that, “one of the leading 
objects,” of the treaty, “was to enable the department to overcome the chief obstacle to the 
removal of the Indians…yet remaining in Florida.” The plight of the Western Seminoles, “was 
well known to their brethren in Florida,” and made them, “totally averse to removing and joining 
them.”44 In addition to the pressure produced by the new war in Florida, the Seminoles’ cause 
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was also aided by changes in leadership throughout the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In addition to 
Commissioner Manypenny, who himself insisted on “radical reforms” to improve the 
department, the new Seminole subagent, Josiah Washbourne, and the new Southern 
Superintendent, Thomas Drew, both worked to reconcile the difficulties between the Seminoles 
and Creeks.45 Washbourne reported in 1857 that the new treaty, “has materially altered the 
condition of the Seminoles. With it the entire tribe is satisfied…They could not have signed a 
better treaty.”46  
 Sections of the treaty itself highlight the significance of the Florida Seminoles in the 
decision of the United States government to finally acquiesce to the demands for a new 
arrangement. The opening line of the “Treaty With The Creeks, Etc.” states that “Whereas the 
United States desire, by providing the Seminoles remaining in Florida with a comfortable home 
west of the Mississippi River, and by making a liberal and generous provision for their welfare, 
to induce them to emigrate and become one people with their brethren already west.” Seven out 
of the treaty’s twenty-seven articles are explicitly concerned with its effects upon the Florida 
Seminoles.47 The new treaty did not, however, immediately cause the Florida Seminoles to 
abandon their campaign of warfare. Skirmishes continued throughout 1857 as military patrols 
moved about South Florida. But in January of 1858, yet another delegation of Western 
Seminoles traveled to Florida to confer with Bowlegs. After being informed of the new treaty 
and offered monetary inducements, Bowlegs and his followers finally agreed to leave Florida, 
although approximately one hundred Indians still remained in the state. 
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The official reports of those working within the Bureau of Indian Affairs illustrate that an 
administrative disconnect existed between government agents in Washington, Florida, and Indian 
Territory, despite the massive amounts of correspondences sent between them. Appointment 
turnover, physical distance, and personal motivations were all partly to blame. Although most of 
the officials who worked closely with the Indian tribes were acutely aware of the problems that 
existed, the bureaucratic mechanisms of the U.S. government with regards to Indian Affairs 
moved too slowly to respond to such fluid situations. The amount of time that it took for the 
Western Seminoles to gain exclusive control over their affairs, and the efforts of the Florida 
Seminoles to resist removal, must be at least partly attributed to the bureaucratic divide. 
 
Chief Holatta Micco (Billy Bowlegs) 
Another factor to consider is the life of Chief Bowlegs and his experiences with United 
States diplomacy. Bowlegs was one of the seven Seminole chiefs who visited the West and 
signed the treaties at Payne’s Landing (1832) and Fort Gibson (1833), which allegedly obligated 
the Seminole people to leave Florida and accept lands in the Arkansas Territory. Although the 
Seminole chiefs later renounced these treaties as having been conducted in bad faith, it is worth 
noting that Bowlegs at least had been considering the option of removal since this time, prior to 
the Second Seminole War. This experience undoubtedly made him wary of promises made by 
the U.S. government. When the Seminoles finally received a treaty to their satisfaction in 1856, 
it was not the act of signing the document which signaled success to Bowlegs. Only after 
assurances came from Western Seminoles that the proposed changes were taking effect and his 
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“slaves” had begun to construct houses for him in the Seminoles’ new territory out west, did 
Bowlegs relinquish the war effort and agree to leave Florida.48   
Many historians have underestimated Bowlegs’ possible incentives for desiring to leave 
Florida. Prior to the Third Seminole War, roughly 400 Indians remained in Florida,49 and after 
Bowlegs and his followers agreed to emigrate, there still remained somewhere between 100 and 
200 Indians left in Florida.50 So with the situation seemingly relatively unchanged, the question 
that must be asked is: Why did the federal government and the white citizens of Florida consider 
the matter sufficiently resolved? Perhaps it was because members of Bowlegs’ band were 
primarily responsible for the conflicts with the region’s whites. Or, perhaps Bowlegs and his 
followers had reasons of their own to consider removal a better option than remaining in Florida. 
During the years of negotiation attempts in between the Second and Third Wars, Bowlegs was 
often the only chief willing to consider the government’s offers, while other chiefs such as Sam 
Jones, Ismahtee, and Chipco either shunned contact with white officials, or were ignored by 
them. Bowlegs’ open-mindedness may simply be attributed to his personal friendship with Agent 
Casey, but further consideration highlights other factors that may have affected his willingness to 
leave Florida.  
The relatively large financial sum offered to Bowlegs by the U. S. government was the 
most obvious material incentive for him and his band to consider removal. When the chief and 
his followers left Florida in May 1858, Bowlegs was given $6,500, his four sub-chiefs, $1000 
each, warriors, $500 each, and each woman and child was given $100, with the total cost of their 
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emigration coming to $70,352.51 In addition, Bowlegs and his band had many family members 
and allies in the West who hoped “to be re-united in one nation with their relatives by blood.”52 
Furthermore, as a nephew of former Chief Micanopy, Bowlegs also had a strong hereditary claim 
to become Head Chief of the Seminole tribe once he arrived in Indian Territory.53 Bowlegs 
seemed to enjoy his prestige and high standing within the tribe, and he also was well familiar 
with the inner-workings of the U.S. diplomatic and military systems.  
Another consideration is the lifestyle and personality of Bowlegs himself. Without 
definitive documentary evidence, we have to consider what we do know about the Seminole 
chief. In the years prior to the war, Bowlegs was known to have frequently visited trading posts, 
the homes of white settlers, and army camps and forts. He spoke English fluently, was on good 
terms with the Spanish fishing villages, drove cattle to sell to Cuban contacts, embarked on 
wide-ranging hunting expeditions across the state, kept up a regular open communication with 
Casey, and diligently tried to maintain peaceful relations with his white neighbors. In addition, 
Bowlegs’ towns and villages were quite large, with a multitude of livestock and large areas of 
cultivated land, and their secrecy was difficult to maintain. In contrast, the other Florida Indian 
chiefs, such as Chipco and Sam Jones, apparently lived in reclusive isolation, and continued to 
do so until the late nineteenth century. The measures passed by Florida’s law-makers that 
restricted the Seminoles’ ability to trade, hunt beyond their reserve boundaries, and visit the 
coastlines would be detrimental to Bowlegs’ customary lifestyle. While a full assessment of 
Bowlegs is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis, the few points raised here in this brief analysis 
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suggest that, when all considerations were taken into account, he may very well have preferred a 
move to Indian Territory, as long as he had certain guarantees, such as a satisfactory new treaty. 
At the very least, scholars should begin to consider this possibility.    
 
Conclusion  
 When attempting to examine the Seminoles’ motivations for engaging in the Third 
Seminole War, the nature of available evidence dictates that definitive interpretations are 
difficult to produce. Nevertheless, valuable insight may still be gleaned, and must be strived for 
in order to provide more balanced accounts of this historical period. Writing about the Second 
Creek War, historian John Ellisor reminds his readers that “the great majority of our source 
materials come from the points of view of the white males who won the struggle.” Ellisor goes 
on to note that despite this drawback, “there is an abundance of research material, and a very 
careful analysis of this material, employing the techniques of deconstruction and ethnohistory, 
along with the application of common sense in reading between the lines, can give us a 
meaningful interpretation of events, if not a completely full and accurate picture of what 
happened during this important period in U.S. history.”54 The same can certainly be said of the 
Third Seminole War. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS: RESTORING AGENCY 
 In order to better understand the Florida Seminoles’ decision to attack American soldiers 
and begin the Third Seminole War it is necessary to explore evidence found beyond the borders 
of Florida, outside the time-frame of the actual conflict (1855-1858), and beyond the overly-
simplified and anecdotal banana garden interpretation. Although the war is commonly portrayed 
to be of minor significance, it is vital to our understanding of Seminole history and the attempt to 
comprehend the Seminoles’ motivations requires the consideration of a broad range of contextual 
factors. While a few historians have refuted or omitted mention of Canova’s banana garden 
account, none have provided viable alternative explanations for the Seminoles’ choice to wage 
war. In addition to the analysis of the timing and impact of Canova’s account, this study 
demonstrates that any examination of the beginning of the Third Seminole War must take into 
consideration the unresolved situation surrounding the end of the Second Seminole War, the 
years of tension and incidents in Florida between the Second and Third wars, and the most 
neglected aspect of the period, which is the circumstances that unfolded in Indian Territory as the 
Seminoles struggled to survive and gain their independence, and how this influenced the Florida 
Seminoles’ decision to fight another war against the United States military.      
The lack of primary source material from the mid-nineteenth century that represents the 
direct perspective of the Florida Seminoles is quite clearly the largest obstacle that faces 
historians of the period. The white-authored sources, however, are numerous, and because of this 
the Florida Seminoles are usually depicted as reactionary and short-sighted as they responded to 
the activities of white Americans. This viewpoint of the Florida Seminoles denies them the 
ability to influence their own circumstances by their actions while it also reinforces the 
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assumption of an inevitable triumph of white civilization over the savage barbarism of Native 
Americans. Since the exact motivations and strategies of the Seminoles can never be fully known 
through written evidence alone, scholars must analyze more deeply their actions, behaviors, and 
cultural customs in order to provide more meaningful and balanced interpretations. For too long 
the lack of Seminole sources has been used as an excuse to continue the reliance on Canova’s 
banana plant account to explain the opening of the Third Seminole War.  
Another key point regarding Canova’s interpretation is the timing of his book’s 
publication, as well as the works of Coe and Moore-Willson. The shift in popular opinions 
towards Native Americans that occurred in the late nineteenth century is evident in the first wave 
of literature on the Florida Seminoles, and the writings of Canova, Coe, and Moore-Willson 
provided the foundation for the period which included the Third Seminole War. Although 
sympathy and paternalism had begun to replace expressions of outright hatred, the attitudes of 
many white Americans still included a belief in the inherent inferiority and savagery of Native 
peoples, and the banana plant account complimented these perceptions perfectly.  
  The treatment of the Third Seminole War by historians and various other authors has 
lacked variation or originality, largely due to a dependence on previously published secondary 
literature. The failure of many writers to conduct their own primary research has made in-depth 
and meaningful interpretations extremely rare. Another reason for the substandard nature of the 
historiography is that many of the authors who have addressed the subject were not 
professionally trained historians. Beginning with the activism of Coe and Moore-Willson, books 
and articles have also been written by journalists, folk writers, archaeologists and 
anthropologists, and many self-made historians. With the exception of a handful of works by 
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recent historians, the variance of interpretations and the ebb and flow of scholarly debates that 
are so common to other controversial historical topics, are virtually absent in the literature on the 
Third Seminole War.  
 Regarding the preponderance of the banana garden account, it may be that the lack of a 
documentary “smoking gun” has made historians reluctant to challenge the status quo. But 
despite the hegemonic nature of the available evidence, “War is a two-sided affair,” as Watson 
has pointed out, “and we need to restore agency to the Seminoles in their war against American 
aggression.” Watson also implores future researchers to consider the Seminoles as “rational 
actors,” in order to “enhance our understanding of Indian actions beyond the level of tactical 
minutiae, to refocus on political intent.”1 Indeed, the persistent reliance on Canova’s banana 
garden interpretation has greatly undermined the complexity of Seminole history and has served 
to obscure the context necessary to better understand the opening of the Third Seminole War.  
  On a broader level, the findings of this study have implications that are significant for 
the history profession at large. The United States’ interactions and battles with Native Americans 
during the nineteenth century, presumably similar to other relationships between ambitious 
expanding nations and indigenous groups, represented a vast power imbalance that was 
manifested in the first wave of literature on the subject in the form of over-simplifications and 
(perhaps unintentional) biases, and filtered through the perspective of white American authors. 
The social evolution that has occurred in the U.S. since that time necessitates the reexamination 
of some older historical interpretations by modern scholars with fresh world-outlooks who are 
unburdened by past prejudices and who are motivated to provide fair and balanced historical 
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treatment of all their subjects. Historical accounts of conflicts with American Indians, and war-
origin stories in general, are especially susceptible to sensationalized and simplistic explanations, 
but fuller interpretations will be possible if historians can demonstrate open-minded 
professionalism and a willingness to tackle complex historical issues with new methods and 
mindsets.  
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